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In this chapter, we examine what we call the triangle of peace in the Middle East, with reference to the peaceful international borders established upon the completion of peace treaties between Egypt and Israel on March 26, 1979, and between Israel and Jordan on October 26, 1994. In both cases, we show that international peace, especially in the case of Israel-Egypt, has been a permissive condition for the occurrence and proliferation of illicit transnational flows, including transnational crime and terrorism.Yet, we explain the variance between the two cases with reference to the three variables assessed throughout the book: the degree of physical and institutional openness of the peaceful borders; the degree of governance and institutional strength of the bordering states; and the prevalent socioeconomic conditions of the neighboring states. The Egyptian-Israeli case has registered significant instances of transnational crime and terrorism, whereas the Israeli-Jordanian dyad is almost a non-case, except for drugs trafficking. Their variance is explained in geopolitical terms, governance, the presence or absence of buffer zones, and the dominance of the security discourse.
Chapter 3 examines the evolution of Israel’s foreign policy of engagement under the Rabin government. It explains why the Israel-PLO and Israel-Syria peace processes remained contested, while Israel’s negotiations with Jordan yielded a peace accord. The chapter uncovers the deepening tension between the government pursing Israel’s policy of engagement and the domestic opposition it unleashed. It concludes that Israel’s foreign policy transition from entrenchment to engagement remained reversible. On the one hand, Israel concluded a peace agreement with Jordan, continued negotiations with the PLO and Syria, and engaged in budding negotiations with Arab countries in the Gulf and the Maghreb. On the other, however, nearing the brink of peace obscured a less visible, but highly significant fact, namely, that the Arab-Israeli peace process was enfeebled by domestic challenges. These included, for example, the deadly terrorist attacks launched by Hamas, hostile public opinion, and mounting political opposition in parliament on the grounds that engagement posed security risks to Israel and was anathema to its Jewish and Zionist identity of the state.
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