This chapter examines four cases of collapsed states from the Middle East and North Africa – Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen. State collapse was marked by the breakdown of national institutions and the effective loss of a functioning central government. Different governance arrangements appeared across the territory of the country. This chapter discusses the nature of state collapse and its bearing on constitution-making processes and constitutional design. International actors may be drawn in as partisans of different factions or as potential mediators and facilitators of conflict resolution and state reconstruction. Peace-making requires the main factions to accept that the costs of fighting outweigh any benefits and to agree on structured negotiations. Sustainable peace requires agreements on governance, including potentially interim power-sharing, a constitution-making process, transitional security arrangements, and some guiding principles for a reconstructed state. While a federal or devolved governance arrangement may seem logical, the factional elites may prefer power-sharing at the center. If they do opt for a federal or devolved structure, they face vexing issues in defining the constituent units, the allocation of powers, and the nature of central institutions, which may result in an extended period of muddled governance and power politics with no constitutional clarity.

Leaving aside the narrow framing of the international courtroom, this chapter focuses on the Congolese district of Ituri, caught in the crossfire of larger national and international forces. The collapse of the sprawling Congo nation in the 1990s prompted outside intrusions from Rwanda and Uganda, spreading conflicts across the entire territory. Military stalemates stirred competing national rebel movements, with patronage relations to Congo’s eastern neighbors and to global trading networks. In the midst of country-wide conflict and regional politics, the ICC Prosecutor selected a single outlying district for his criminal investigation. While the trials would reduce complex events and causes to the actions taken by three men placed on trial, the wider matrix of forces continued to shape the overall conflicts. Under international pressure to rebuild the Congolese state, the main national factions bargained over power-sharing political transitions. The fate of local players in Ituri remained outside the national discourse, even as it drew attention from the UN and NGOs about increasing ethnic violence.

This chapter offers a brief historical overview, then describes the formation and work of the Libyan National Transition Council, or NTC. Unlike the TPA, the NTC became an interim government even as the ancien régime was still in place. It formed soon after the anti-authoritarian protests began and aimed to coordinate the defeat of the Qadhafi government and oversee day-to-day governance. The NTC needed to establish itself as a legitimate body which could ensure the representation of the Libyan people by facilitating democratic elections. In so doing, it took many actions and decisions, including recruiting membership, organizing itself, securing international assistance, developing a roadmap, coordinating the defeat of Qadhafi, and preparing for and overseeing elections. Each of these acts would have repercussions in the transitional phases to come.

This chapter shows how the decisions and actions taken between January and October 2011 by the Tunisian Provisional Administration (TPA) in Tunisia and by the National Transition Council (NTC) in Libya between February 2011 and July 2012, which were the first interim governments in each country, influenced events between 2014 and 2019. In Tunisia, where the TPA had insisted on abiding by a “spirit of consensus” that helped its successor government, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA)/Troika, overcome its crisis of 2013, a second republic had been inaugurated under a constitution that was written in this spirit. However, governing in this spirit – implementing and operating through consensual institutions – proved much more difficult and caused many challenges in later years. In Libya, the NTC had been unable to assert a moderate, unifying narrative and governing presence; it was instead drowned out by extremist forces as the NTC gave way to its successor, the General National Congress (GNC). The GNC became so plagued by the features and decisions of the NTC – among others, its inability to control armed groups or assert a shared Libyan vision – that the next several years were defined by spiraling conflict among groups of varying goals and identities.

Leaving aside the narrow framing of the international courtroom, this chapter focuses on the Congolese district of Ituri, caught in the crossfire of larger national and international forces. The collapse of the sprawling Congo nation in the 1990s prompted outside intrusions from Rwanda and Uganda, spreading conflicts across the entire territory. Military stalemates stirred competing national rebel movements, with patronage relations to Congo’s eastern neighbors and to global trading networks. In the midst of country-wide conflict and regional politics, the ICC Prosecutor selected a single outlying district for his criminal investigation. While the trials would reduce complex events and causes to the actions taken by three men placed on trial, the wider matrix of forces continued to shape the overall conflicts. Under international pressure to rebuild the Congolese state, the main national factions bargained over power-sharing political transitions. The fate of local players in Ituri remained outside the national discourse, even as it drew attention from the UN and NGOs about increasing ethnic violence.

This appendix outlines and reflects on the methodological choices that shaped the research behind this book. It discusses positionality and research ethics, fieldwork in various parts of Bosnia, and the conduct and analysis of interviews.

This chapter examines the limitations of international intervention in dealing with socioeconomic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The argument advanced here is that the international intervention was limited in two respects: first, by its narrow understanding of ‘justice’; second, by the priorities embedded in post-socialist economic reforms, which left no space for justice considerations. Thus, the chapter analyses, on the one hand, how international officials in Bosnia understood transitional justice, as well as the limited and flawed implementation of return programmes, reparations, and other aspects of reparative justice. On the other hand, it looks at economic and social reforms promoted by international institutions at the end of the conflict, showing that they posed significant obstacles to redressing the legacies of socioeconomic violence and achieving socioeconomic justice. Reforms in the fields of labour laws and social policy, privatisations and industrial policy, and macroeconomic policy are analysed in this part of the chapter.

The conclusion of the book sums up the key arguments and findings and their contribution to the field of transitional justice and beyond. It builds on this to reflect on three key issues emerging from the book: rethinking socioeconomic justice and its role in post-conflict justice processes; the role and accountability of economic actors, including economic actors that are traditionally left out from transitional justice debates; and the possible pathways towards better justice processes in the future.

This chapter examines the limitations of international intervention in dealing with socioeconomic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The argument advanced here is that the international intervention was limited in two respects: first, by its narrow understanding of ‘justice’; second, by the priorities embedded in post-socialist economic reforms, which left no space for justice considerations. Thus, the chapter analyses, on the one hand, how international officials in Bosnia understood transitional justice, as well as the limited and flawed implementation of return programmes, reparations, and other aspects of reparative justice. On the other hand, it looks at economic and social reforms promoted by international institutions at the end of the conflict, showing that they posed significant obstacles to redressing the legacies of socioeconomic violence and achieving socioeconomic justice. Reforms in the fields of labour laws and social policy, privatisations and industrial policy, and macroeconomic policy are analysed in this part of the chapter.

The conclusion of the book sums up the key arguments and findings and their contribution to the field of transitional justice and beyond. It builds on this to reflect on three key issues emerging from the book: rethinking socioeconomic justice and its role in post-conflict justice processes; the role and accountability of economic actors, including economic actors that are traditionally left out from transitional justice debates; and the possible pathways towards better justice processes in the future.

This chapter theorises socioeconomic justice in the context of post-war and transitional societies. It draws on the work of Nancy Fraser and socio-legal scholars studying justice and human rights as a social practice in order to: first, define socioeoconomic justice as the redress to a form of violence that is rooted in the political economy of conflict, and whose remedy requires redistribution; second, to conceptualise justice as a practice where struggles over both the meaning of justice and the forms of participation to the justice process inevitably occur. Socioeconomic justice is also seen as having a particular temporal dimension, which is discussed with reference to Bosnia's post-war and post-socialist condition. Lastly, the chapter defines the international intervention as discussed in this book, focusing on justice issues and economic reforms.

This chapter theorises socioeconomic justice in the context of post-war and transitional societies. It draws on the work of Nancy Fraser and socio-legal scholars studying justice and human rights as a social practice in order to: first, define socioeoconomic justice as the redress to a form of violence that is rooted in the political economy of conflict, and whose remedy requires redistribution; second, to conceptualise justice as a practice where struggles over both the meaning of justice and the forms of participation to the justice process inevitably occur. Socioeconomic justice is also seen as having a particular temporal dimension, which is discussed with reference to Bosnia's post-war and post-socialist condition. Lastly, the chapter defines the international intervention as discussed in this book, focusing on justice issues and economic reforms.

The chapter introduces the focus of the book, which is the importance of socioeconomic justice for transitional justice processes. While there is still scepticism in the literature as to whether and how transitional justice should address socioeconomic concerns, it seems increasingly evident that - in the Bosnian case discussed in the book as elsewhere - citizens of post-conflict countries mobilise around socioeconomic issues that are strictly linked to the legacies of post-conflict violence. The chapter briefly introduces the theoretical focus of the book, at the nexus of justice and political economy, and presents its argument and outline.

The chapter introduces the focus of the book, which is the importance of socioeconomic justice for transitional justice processes. While there is still scepticism in the literature as to whether and how transitional justice should address socioeconomic concerns, it seems increasingly evident that - in the Bosnian case discussed in the book as elsewhere - citizens of post-conflict countries mobilise around socioeconomic issues that are strictly linked to the legacies of post-conflict violence. The chapter briefly introduces the theoretical focus of the book, at the nexus of justice and political economy, and presents its argument and outline.

Chapter 7 shows how socioeconomic injustice can act as the catalyst for social mobilisation, looking at the Bosnian protests of 2017. This chaper finally shows how socioeconomic justice issues can be connected to social justice struggles that build on the unresolved legacies of conflict. I explore the claims and slogans of the protests, and trace a connection between these and wartime socioeconomic violence and its continuation during the transition. By looking at the modes of participation and organisation that characterised the protests, I also show how activism and contentious politics are an important part of post-war justice processes. Lastly, the chapter analyses the international community’s reaction to the protests, highlighting its rigid conception of ‘justice’ and inability to engage in meaningful dialogue with a grassroots, horizontal movement.

Chapter 7 shows how socioeconomic injustice can act as the catalyst for social mobilisation, looking at the Bosnian protests of 2017. This chaper finally shows how socioeconomic justice issues can be connected to social justice struggles that build on the unresolved legacies of conflict. I explore the claims and slogans of the protests, and trace a connection between these and wartime socioeconomic violence and its continuation during the transition. By looking at the modes of participation and organisation that characterised the protests, I also show how activism and contentious politics are an important part of post-war justice processes. Lastly, the chapter analyses the international community’s reaction to the protests, highlighting its rigid conception of ‘justice’ and inability to engage in meaningful dialogue with a grassroots, horizontal movement.

Although forceful, militia-led conservation continues in north-eastern CAR, it has been joined and at times supplanted by rebellions, some led by former pisteurs who have turned their martial skills to this new end. Rebellious ways and intervention by outsiders have long histories in Central Africa, but the particular forms these practices have taken in the last 15 years are new. Among other changes, men consciously self-style as rebels, and there has been an enormous influx of the people I have elsewhere called the ‘good intentions crowd’ (international organisation officials, aid organisation employees, diplomats, and others who understand themselves as ‘external’ and altruistic and yet become central and interested participants in rebellion in post-Cold War Africa). This chapter shows how the new rebels relate to and transform the serious games around forceful acquisition and status that are the book’s main focus. This project provides an opportunity to sit with four adventurous men involved in these shifts around force, acquisition, and status over the last few decades. All had been previously involved in different kinds of shows of force, such as the denunciations for the sake of liberty that made up such a big part of conservation work. Now, by using the symbolic register of rebellion, they want their shows of force to communicate something else: namely their status as meriting regard, a status they imagined would take the form of a salaried or otherwise entitled relationship to the state. They hoped that the good intentions crowd’s involvement would help them leverage their demands for distribution. In this respect, the rebels have largely failed, or at least been disappointed. But while they have not achieved the kind of entitled status they hoped for, they have also enjoyed certain adventurous aspects of their careers and the new lifestyles and ideas they have encountered.