Constitutionally, the twenty-first century begins in 1997 with the election of the New Labour government, a government committed to constitutional reform. Most of the New Labour reforms will probably prove to be irreversible. Indeed, the Labour government of 1997–2010 may well be more remembered for these constitutional reforms than for anything it did in the social and economic sphere. And the reforms did not end with Labour’s defeat in 2010. They were continued by David Cameron’s Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government (the first peacetime coalition since 1931), which ruled Britain between 2010 and 2015.

Most older people do not need any special legal support or protection. They are formed of diverse groups and clearly not all are vulnerable to abuses of one form or another. However, some older people are evidently more at risk than others because of ill-health, disability or dementia, or because of their dependency. They may require protection from physical or mental abuse and misuse of their money or property, and at some stage they may need help with making decisions. They may also require legal protection in respect of the provision of treatment or care, especially if the care arrangements involve them being deprived of their liberty.

Older people, especially those with dementia, may require support from diverse agencies, such as housing and social services, and are the main users of the NHS. Discrimination, victimisation or neglect of older people within the health and social care system raise important issues under human rights law, along with other domestic law or international law obligations. The Acts that are outlined in this chapter are aimed at protecting the basic human rights of people at risk, who share with all of us the right to live our lives as we choose.

This chapter provides an overview of the legislative frameworks that are relevant to the management of violence by persons with mental disorders in the United Kingdom. Three jurisdictions apply (England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). Individual frameworks and their variants are not discussed in detail; rather, substantial differences relevant to the management of violence are highlighted. Core principles guiding routine medical practice of ‘consent’ and ‘do no harm’ remain relevant in the management of violence, and legislation provides a framework when coercion may be necessary to manage an acute violent act, the immediate risk of further violence or the longer-term risk of violence. Pertinent legislation is discussed, including the Human Rights Act 1998, and mental health and mental capacity acts. Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS), which are soon to be replaced by the Liberty Protection Safeguard Scheme (LPS), community treatment orders (CTOs) and review of the Mental Health Act are also discussed.

This chapter presents the story of how proportionality became a core concept in English public law. This is a story of continuity and change. It is only since its connection to European law during the 1980s that proportionality acquired conceptual autonomy and was distinguished from the common law concept of reasonableness. While its application in domestic judicial review was rejected during the 1990s, the promoters of proportionality sought continuity between the common law and European human rights standards, among them proportionality. Since the incorporation of the convention in the domestic sphere, proportionality applies as a different head of review from irrationality. As a prong-structured test, it is very akin to the global proportionality model and it involves a significant extension of judicial powers. Still, the doctrine of deference ensures that the role of courts remains different from the one ascribed to the primary decision-makers.

The chapter shows that there is a general right to conscientious exemption in UK law. There are at least two rules of law which ground the right. These are (a) the requirement that public authorities and legislation (both primary and subordinate) comply with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA); and (b) the prohibition of indirect discrimination on the basis of religion or belief in employment and provision of goods and services arising under anti-discrimination legislation. The chapter tentatively sets out another rule of law which may ground the general right. This is the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of religion in the enjoyment of Convention Rights arising under Art 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’). The reason this ground is tentative is that it has not been relied on in UK courts although it has been successfully relied on in the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) to receive an exemption from a legislative rule. Without explicit UK case law it is unwise to declare that this rule of law is another ground of the general right in UK law.