The chapter situates the class of institutions variously referred to as internationalized, hybrid, mixed or special tribunals in the system of international criminal justice and highlights their main rationales and features. It addresses the known strengths and weaknesses of the hybrid institutional model as compared to purely international criminal jurisdictions. Using the classification based on these courts’ legal nature as defined by the primary basis for their establishment and functioning, the chapter surveys the main hybrid courts (including some which are yet to be established), including but not limited to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Extraordinary African Chambers, the African Criminal Court, the UNTAET and UNMIK Special Panels (in East Timor and in Kosovo, respectively), the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, and the Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic. It outlines the factual background to these courts’ emergence and addresses their subject-matter jurisdiction and applicable law, institutional and procedural features, and noteworthy contributions to international criminal jurisprudence. This overview is followed by the discussion of the issues raised by the hybrid courts’ (potential) relationship with the ICC and reflections on their achievements, deficiencies, and (the prospects of) wider impact.

After several months of fighting, it became clear to outside observers that Habré’s forces had gained the upper hand. Goukouni then asked Gaddafi to formalize and escalate the support he had received over the past several months. This culminated in a friendship treaty and a meticulously organized Libyan ground invasion of Chad in December 1980. This forced Habré to disengage from N’Djamena, and flee the country. Most of his forces managed to regroup and withdrawal into neighboring Sudan, from which Habré soon began conducting guerilla operations. In early 1981, Gaddafi and Goukouni announced the “merger” of Chad and Libya. This chapter narrates these events, and questions how French policy failed to prevent the kind of nightmare scenario which had haunted French officials over the previous three years. It also discusses the origins of a growing American role in support of Habré. The chapter further introduces the early approach of Mitterrand's presidency towards Chad and assesses the gradual shift in French policy which helped to encourage Goukouni to expel Libyan forces from Chad.

This chapter examines French policy toward's Chad following Libya's withdrawal in November 1981. It focuses on French efforts to facilitate the deployment of an OAU peacekeeping force, and its renewed engagement with the government in N'Djamena. It also examines the role of regional powers and the United States in the OAU deployment and Habré's consquent loss of foreign support. The chapter analyzes the OAU's failure to stabilize the Chadian political scene, and growing French indifference to the outcome of the war between Habré and the N'Djamena government. It concludes with Habré's seizure of power and his initial efforts to consolidate his rule.

This chapter centers on Franco-Chadian relations during the “Claustre Affair,” from 1974-1977. This began when the two rebel leaders of a weakened “2nd Army,” Hissène Habré and Goukouni Weddeye kidnapped several French and German citizens, including Françoise Claustre, the wife of the head of the MRA. This set the stage for a nearly three year-long series of negotiations between French officials, the rebel movement, and the Chadian government. During these negotiations, Habré arrested and later executed one of the French negotiators, Captain Pierre Galopin, and Pierre Claustre, Françoise’s husband, himself became a hostage.The chapter also focuses on the weight of French influence in the Chadian regime’s decision-making processes and the role this played in Franco-Chadian relations over the next few years. It discusses the coup d’état that overthrew Tombalbaye in 1975 and the advent of his successor, the Conseil supérieur militaire (CSM) under General Félix Malloum. Finally, the chapter chronicles the way that France’s negotiation strategy facilitated increased Libyan military and diplomatic involvement with different factions of the Chadian rebellion. Ultimately, this support upset the balance of power within the country and facilitated a return to outright war.

This chapter looks at the Chadian political scene from February to September 1979. It chronicles the growing interest of Nigeria in influencing the outcome of Chad’s conflicts. It charts the evolution of Franco-Nigerian relations, from close cooperation in early 1979 to open hostility and Nigerian-Libyan rapprochement towards the middle of the year. This was particularly on display in the context of a series of major peace conferences held in Nigeria among different factions during this time. The chapter also examines the debates among French officials over the evolving role of Tacaud. These principally revolved around the main dilemma posed by Tacaud’s presence after the signature of the Lagos agreement creating a new transitional government in August 1979. On the one hand, suspicion grew on all sides, including within the French government, about the French army’s closeness with Habré. This, combined with strong Libyan and Nigerian pressure, led the Lagos agreement to demand the withdrawal of French forces. On the other hand, all of the Chadian factions privately told their French interlocutors that they wanted Tacaud to remain in the country. Consequently, French policymakers debated Tacaud’s usefulness, and whether or not Giscard should order a complete withdrawal.

This chapter covers the delicate politics surrounding the integration of Habré’s faction into the CSM. It also describes how French military successes against different rebel factions led to divisions within the northern rebellion, and a split between its main leader, Goukouni Weddeye, and Gaddafi’s Libya. It then covers the fighting which broke out between Habré and Malloum in February 1979. The chapter looks at how the balance of power shifted in favor of Habré as Goukouni’s forces infiltrated the capital and joined Habré’s men. The chapter also analyzes the ambiguous role played by France in facilitating a northern victory, as well as the subsequent debates and recriminations within the French policymaking apparatus. This led to a sharp deterioration in relations between French military officials and diplomats. Meanwhile, by early March 1979, over half of N’Djamena’s population had fled the city towards the south, thus effectively leaving behind an ethnically cleansed capital in the hands of a fragile coalition of Frolinat rebels.

Chapter 5 addresses the potential role of domestic courts and mechanisms in the adjudication and award of reparations for international crimes. It draws from existing studies in the field and examines the role that domestic courts may have in adjudicating claims of reparations for international crimes. It analyzes these questions through case studies of domestic reparations for international crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the international criminal tribunal did not have a reparative dimension. It also provides a unique contribution through a timely discussion of the development of universal civil jurisdiction, including the challenges, recent case law from different countries and the United States through the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), as well as recent decisions by US courts limiting its jurisdictions on the ATCA. With this chapter, the book provides a careful survey and analysis of the intricacies of international, national, and administrative mechanisms that are being developed to address reparative justice for international crimes, their unique challenges and some suggestions on how reparative justice for international crimes should develop.