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Epistemic consequentialism is the view that epistemic goodness is more fundamental than epistemic rightness. In this article, I examine the relationship between epistemic consequentialism and theistic belief. I argue that in an epistemic consequentialist framework, there is an epistemic reason to believe in God. Imagine having an unlimited amount of time to ask an omniscient being anything you wanted. The potential epistemic benefits would be enormous. Considerations like these point to an epistemic version of Pascal's wager. I compare and contrast the epistemic wager with the traditional wager, and argue that the epistemic wager has several notable advantages.
Edited by
Jonathan Fuqua, Conception Seminary College, Missouri,John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC,Tyler McNabb, Saint Francis University, Pennsylvania
Traditional theistic arguments conclude that God exists. Pragmatic theistic arguments, by contrast, conclude that you ought to believe in God. The two most famous pragmatic theistic arguments are put forth by Blaise Pascal (1662) and William James (1896). Pragmatic arguments for theism can be summarized as follows: believing in God has significant benefits, and these benefits are not available for the unbeliever. Thus, you should believe in, or “wager on,” God. This chapter distinguishes between various kinds of theistic wagers, including finite vs. infinite wagers, premortem vs. postmortem wagers, and doxastic vs. acceptance wagers. Then, it turns to the epistemic–pragmatic distinction and discusses the nuances of James’ argument, and how views like epistemic permissivism and epistemic consequentialism provide unique “hybrid” wagers. Finally, it covers outstanding objections and responses.
This chapter explores the visual sources for violence and warfare created over the millennium from 500 to 1500 in the lands where Islam became a major presence. It divides the copious evidence into three chronological blocks (early, middle and late) to highlight the different visual sources that predominate in each period (architectural decoration, portable objects and illustrated manuscripts). The many scenes of violence depicted on these buildings and objects reflect the unsettled times and places where they were made and the constant occurrence of battles and warfare, some of it with sophisticated weaponry. But these vignettes of warfare and fighting also reflect a more positive view of violence, designed to invoke the prowess and heroism of the object’s owner. This triumphal theme extends to nature and the animal kingdom, as man dominates and tames the often-inhospitable landscape and the wild beasts in it. Many incidents also allude to the legendary and literary past, particularly in Iran, and metaphorically tie the object’s owner (and the viewer) to epic heroes. These many scenes of violence are thus multivalent and require decoding.
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