The efforts of academics, conservative think tanks, and political leaders on emphasizing markets and reducing government paid off after the election of President Ronald Reagan, which resulted in a new mix of government and markets, although not to the extent that many proponents of small government favored. There have been additional legal procedures and political oversight, which has made it more difficult to regulate some markets; government services have been outsourced, and government spending on regulation and social welfare has been reduced. Bill Clinton, influenced by the anti-government mood in the county, supported deregulation of telecommunications, welfare, and banking, but Congress reversed the banking deregulation after a Wall Street collapse in 2008 and was forced to spend billions of dollars to save the economy. Despite the anti-government mood, nearly all the laws and programs established in the New Deal and Great Society eras have remained on the books and have not been repealed. Besides the bailout, there were some other significant expansions of government including most notably the Affordable Care Act, popularly known as Obama Care.

Chapter 4 reconstruct how the zeitgeist, the political and economic practices, and the geopolitical and societal circumstances of the war times guided Western Europe to a path of deeper international and regional cooperation focused on free trade and valuta convertibility. During exile and occupation, European governments fleshed out plans and schemes for post-war cooperation, primordially in the domains of socio-economic and the financial-economic planning, in greater (practical) detail. Initially, however, the step from grand designs and lofty models for a post-war Western order that could ‘win the peace’ to the practices of policies of cooperation was taken via the institutional engineering in the Atlantic world, most prominently through the ‘system’ envisioned in Bretton Woods. However, the original ideas behind Bretton Woods soon proved a bridge too far in practice, which complicated global ambitions as well as the proper build-up of Atlantic-wide institutions—and pushed Western Europe to think and act ‘beyond Americanisation’.

The content of separation of powers is neither defined in constitutions, which usually do not explicitly guarantee this principle, nor in other legal texts. Its content cannot be circumscribed with precision. Several influential authors have dealt extensively with separation of powers. However, few of them were constitutional and economic thinkers. After careful analysis, but without claiming to be exhaustive, two major names stand out. The connection between reflections by Montesquieu and Hayek on the concentration of state power on one hand, and on economic concentration on the other hand, is illuminating and fascinating, but has never before been established. Aron also deserves a special mention in this regard, as he notably dealt with democracy and totalitarianism as well as competition in the same breath throughout some major parts of his work.

This chapter sets out the dystopian critique of the liberal democratic state that emerged when neoclassical economic reasoning was applied to the political realm. The resulting ‘public choice theory’ made assertive claims of democratic state failure that became a mainstay of neoliberal argument, but here they are shown to possess clear affinities with the Leninist account of bureaucracy as the ‘real’ centre of power in a bourgeois democracy. It follows from the deterministic, closed-system reasoning in both Leninist and neoclassical 'public choice' theory that these affinities continued into the respective prescriptions for the preferred constitutional order. The ideal constitution of limited government set out in public choice theory, most notably by James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Geoffrey Brennan is shown to be a logically inevitable counterpart to the ‘withering away of the state’ under socialism anticipated by Lenin. The adjacent constitutional arguments of Friedrich August von Hayek are also considered, as is the more empirically robust account of bureuacracy as an essential feature of modernity set out by Max Weber.

Returning to the Myanmar government's ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya people, this chapter argues: how could Facebook not have known that its platform was being abused to promote genocide? The answer draws on longstanding scholarship across political science, urban studies, economics, and other fields relating to the problems that centralized governors have in drawing together knowledge from the peripheries of their territories. It is argued that the appropriate solution to problems of knowledge in the platform context is to design democratic and polycentric governance institutions permitting ordinary people to have influence over company decisions.

Problems and potential solutions do not speak to themselves: people recognize them and size them up in an active process of cognition. The open-ended nature of problem-solving activities requires that our minds can avoid being paralyzed by several infinite regress problems that conventional economics overlooks. This chapter explores how people allocate their attention between implementing solutions to problems and scanning for new problems and how they judge whether incoming information signifies a problem. It draws parallels with how scientists and object recognition technologies operate via systems of rules, and it presents an original synthesis of Hayek’s theory of the mind (a forerunner to modern theories of brain plasticity), Kelly’s personal construct psychology, Koestler’s work on creativity, Simon’s theory of satisficing and the dual-system view of thinking, and of the role of associative memory processes suggested by Kahneman. The analysis explains how “what comes to mind” is determined as we try to find matches between incoming stimuli and templates from our memories and how we resolve cognitive dissonance between what we expect and what initially seems to be going on.

The appropriate choice between business and public enterprise is determined by the interaction between a financial time horizon and the product or project’s economic life. The prevailing interest rate defines a precise credit time horizon which is a temporal outer bound for commercial enterprise. Projects which need longer to break even cannot be funded by business alone. Long-term projects face uncertainty and attempts to control it by means of rigid contracts lead to inferior outcomes. A ‘franchise’ overcomes the temporal boundary. Protection from uncertainty is provided by social and government agencies. Investment ‘manias’ set aside time horizons and can leave a legacy of real assets. Public–private partnerships for infrastructure development are a franchise intended to overcome credit time horizons. They were embraced by New Labour, but have given rise to inefficiency and corruption and are currently in decline. The time-horizon model undermines the standard argument for market superiority. It turns Hayek on his head: it is financial markets that require certainty, whereas social and public agencies manage in its absence.

This Chapter introduces the book’s premises and general approach to the discussion of the soverign debt-human rights relatioship, together with the book’s outline. It also discusses and defines legal human rights, economic and social rights as international human rights, an the concepts of neoliberalism, neoliberal epistemolgy and law’s neoliberalisation for the purposes of the analysis that follows in Chapters 2-5.

In this chapter, I explore the topic of the economic rights of non-citizens through the lens of the history of philosophy. I make two different but interconnected arguments in this chapter. In the first part of the chapter, I examine the claims made by John Locke, Adam Smith, and Friedrich von Hayek that a well-regulated market, supplemented by robust government support, is necessary for the realization of basic economic rights. Though the views of Locke, Smith, and Hayek are important in understanding how economic rights can be realized and the role the state should play in this, they do not directly address what this might mean for non-citizens. I suggest in the next part that their views must be supplemented by the work of Hannah Arendt and her concept of the right to have rights. I suggest that her argument that the right to have rights is more fundamental than human rights can be extended to economic rights. Non-citizens need a right to have economic rights, that is, a right to belong to an economic community. I conclude by discussing the example of refugees in the Global South and some ways that we might support a right to have economic rights.

The forces that reorganized human society that came with the agricultural revolution still control and constrain our social evolution today. The human global economy has become a global, unified, interlocking system of resource extraction and surplus production. Integral to this system are institutions and belief systems supporting it. Today, neoliberalism is the dominant ideology supporting the ultrasocial system. Far from supporting individual freedom, it is a philosophy that defends sacrificing the well-being of individuals for the benefit of the global market. Fredrich Hayek, one of the leading figures of neoliberal thought, was influenced by biological theories of group selection and recognized that the market economy was a kind of superorganism. Neoliberals explicitly argue that the market is a supreme information processing system, far superior to human reason. The political agenda of neoliberals is twofold: to protect the market from public regulation and to promote government spending to expand market activity.

Chapter 4 discusses the wider theoretical arguments in Thoughts and Details. Burke maintained that a harmony of interest emerged between buyers and sellers in a system of free exchange, which enabled both parties to benefit from voluntary contractual arrangements. The practice of commercial virtues, such as diligence and industry, was encouraged by this incentive structure. Even though he did champion market liberty, however, Burke should not be considered a strict advocate of laissez-faire economics because of his support for chartered corporations, his conditional approval of the Navigation Acts, and a number of other instances in which he endorsed state intervention in the economy, such as the corn bounty. More broadly, I posit that Burke’s economic thought was a precursor to F. A. Hayek’s epistemic conception of political economy. Both thinkers recognized that man’s intellect struggled to fully comprehend the complexities of social life, and that planned economies failed to consider the primacy of circumstance in individual market transactions. Therefore, governments should practice restraint in their supervision of markets. Additionally I contend that Burke’s praise of markets affirmed his commitment to human experience, not abstract theory. Hence Thoughts and Details represents continuities with his other commentary on the limits of reason.