We evaluate the impact of the 2017 Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (TCJA) pension tax break on sponsor contributions to defined-benefit retirement plans. We exploit cross-sectional variation in ex-ante exposure to the tax break. We find that the tax break induced an extra $2.8 billion of sponsor contributions to medium- and large-scale plans in 2017. However, we find strong evidence of reversal, both in terms of sponsor contributions and plan funding ratios by 2018. Our contributions model indicates that this reversal is consistent with more binding financial constraints in 2018 relative to 2019. Our results suggest that the TCJA did not have a long-lasting impact on corporate defined-benefit pension funds.

This paper makes the most of the observed actions of bribe takers and givers from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and studies how a taker's action influences a giver's decision to pay bribes. To motivate our empirical study, we consider Kaufmann and Wei's (1999) Stackelberg game between a tax authority and a firm that undergoes tax inspection. The model predicts that, when the authority can use its action as a credible threat for the firm's profitability, the authority disturbs the firm by inspecting more, and the firm is more likely to pay bribes. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, we find correlational evidence that the propensity to pay bribes increases with the number of inspection visits, particularly for non-democratic countries.

This article argues the case for changes to the Goods and Services Tax (GST) as a key part of fundamental tax reform in Australia. A more comprehensive base would bring gains in efficiency and simplicity, with equity goals better met by the income transfer system. Revenue gains of a broader GST base and/or a higher rate could fund tax mix change packages to replace more distorting state stamp duties and fund lower income tax rates. The tax mix change packages would improve efficiency and simplicity, with no substantial changes to aggregate revenue or to equity.

We use experimental methods to investigate subsidy incidence, the transfer of subsidy payments from intended recipients to other economic agents, in privately negotiated spot markets. Our results show that market outcomes in treatments with a subsidy given to either buyers or sellers are significantly different from both a no-subsidy treatment and the competitive prediction of a 50% subsidy incidence. The disparity in incidence across treatments relative to predicted levels suggests that incidence equivalence does not hold in this market setting. Moreover, we find no statistical difference in market outcomes when benefits are framed as a “subsidy” versus a schedule shift.

The National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) is a new pension scheme that will be introduced for employees on modest incomes in the UK from 2012. This paper draws out the implications of the NEST, focusing upon low-paid employees and their employers using data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. The results suggest that the NEST will increase labour costs by between 0.6 and 0.8 per cent on average, and have a disproportionate effect on low pay industries and private sector firms employing fewer than 25 employees. The analysis highlights the potential role of the minimum wage to shield low pay workers from paying a share of the subsidies that the NEST will afford to its members.

This article studies the proceedings used by the Spanish public finances to deal with the unpaid taxes during the last decades of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. The connections between the concerned public institutions, and between these and the taxpayers, are analysed using the statements of tax collectors. The great amount of land seized by the State, as a consequence of unpaid taxes, are a sign of the changes that the Spanish rural areas were suffering. This phenomenon became a serious source of conflict and it made evident the important structural problems of the Restauration Administration.

A benevolent social planner, which faces a cost of public funds because of distortive taxation, wants to finance an upstream monopoly. This monopoly produces a necessary input for a downstream competitive sector which competes á la Cournot (with either a fixed number of firms or free entry in the downstream sector). We show that in both cases an ad valorem access charge is a better regulatory tool than a per unit access charge if the access charges are restrained to be positive. The reverse holds when access charges are used to subsidize the downstream market. We then analyze the incidence of the imperfect competition on final prices.