In October 2020, the Government of Japan formulated a National Action Plan (NAP) on Business and Human Rights in response to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) and ensuing greater international awareness of violations of human rights by corporations.1 In the NAP, the government of Japan stated that on the basis of the UNGPs, it expects companies to (i) formulate human rights policies, (ii) conduct due diligence with respect to human rights, and (iii) establish grievance mechanisms.2 In order to achieve these goals, businesses need to understand whether and how they are violating human rights and prepare appropriate solutions. Whistleblowers play a crucial role in this process.

Over the last several decades, states have demonstrated significant political commitment towards advancing protection and assistance for internally displaced persons. A notable form in which this commitment has been reflected is in the emergence of normative standards, with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UNGP) as the guiding text. The fact that the UNGP framework has found expression in the landscape on internal displacement is evidenced at various levels of governance. Within the African context, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) draws on pertinent normative frameworks, with the UNGP as the leading framework. While this point is often made in general terms, this article focuses on the extent to which the norm on internal displacement has diffused and expanded within the African context.

How will emerging autonomous and intelligent systems affect the international landscape of power and coercion two decades from now? Will the world see a new set of artificial intelligence (AI) hegemons just as it saw a handful of nuclear powers for most of the twentieth century? Will autonomous weapon systems make conflict more likely or will states find ways to control proliferation and build deterrence, as they have done (fitfully) with nuclear weapons? And importantly, will multilateral forums find ways to engage the technology holders, states as well as industry, in norm setting and other forms of controlling the competition? The answers to these questions lie not only in the scope and spread of military applications of AI technologies but also in how pervasive their civilian applications will be. Just as civil nuclear energy and peaceful uses of outer space have cut into and often shaped discussions on nuclear weapons and missiles, the burgeoning uses of AI in consumer products and services, health, education, and public infrastructure will shape views on norm setting and arms control. New mechanisms for trust and confidence-building measures might be needed not only between China and the United States—the top competitors in comprehensive national strength today—but also among a larger group of AI players, including Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.

In June 2014, the Human Rights Council passed a resolution establishing an inter-governmental working group to discuss a legally binding instrument relating to transnational corporations and other business enterprises. In this article, I outline four arguments for why such an instrument is desirable. Identifying the purpose of such a treaty is crucial in outlining a vision of what it should seek to achieve and in determining its content. The arguments indicate that a treaty is necessary to provide legal solutions to cure serious lacunae and ambiguities in the current framework of international law which have a serious negative impact upon the rights of individuals affected by corporate activities. The emphasis throughout is upon why a binding legal instrument is important, as opposed to softer forms of regulation such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The four arguments in turn provide the resources to respond to objections raised against the treaty and to reject an alternative, more restrictive proposal for a treaty that only addresses ‘gross’ human rights violations.

This article discusses some of the challenges that may be encountered by companies seeking to adhere to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights when operating in conflict-affected countries. The authors argue that corporate respect for human rights may not be sufficient to correct or compensate for state failure and also suggest that the leverage or influence enjoyed by individual companies in relation to the conduct of security forces and host governments may be limited, particularly in times of crisis. There is therefore a need for a collective approach to human rights risks in conflict-affected countries, and this should focus on public security sector reform and good governance as well as on corporate due diligence.