Frontline crisis teams are typically very cohesive, characterized by strong bonds between members. Cohesion ensures that team members look out for each other in dangerous work environments, operate resiliently in crisis contexts, and can rapidly coordinate in stressful situations. This explains why many crisis organizations are total institutions. Yet, cohesion may also produce dysfunctional group dynamics, as open debate about the crisis and the required response is avoided. Contestation in crisis teams is often deplored and might escalate into conflict, but it does ensure a thorough analysis of the situation from diverse viewpoints and thus facilitates the adoption of a well-considered, mindful response. The simultaneous need for cohesion and contestation creates a dilemma. To deal with this dilemma, it is important to note that team tensions are varied. Crisis organizations, particularly those with complex tasks, can pursue task-related contestation, while upholding relationship-related cohesion. This requires an investment in mutual trust and respect, so that team develops a safe space for open interactions without risking hostility or disintegration.

We rely on other people’s ideas because they often know more than we do about many aspects of the world. A negative consequence of shared beliefs occurs when people focus too much on information that originates from people who hold the same opinions. A group is particularly vulnerable to groupthink when its members have similar backgrounds, the group is insulated from outside opinions, and there are no clear rules for decision making. Shared beliefs can nonetheless contribute to group cohesion, coordination of ideas, and shared mental models. The flipside of shared beliefs are unshared beliefs that can cause conflicts. Advice for resolving conflicts includes engaging in persuasive listening, acknowledging common ground, and discussing reasons for a lack of progress. Considering alternative perspectives also broadens views. High levels of task discourse enable team members to resolve ambiguities, refine their ideas, and discuss the potential innovation of those ideas. Training should therefore emphasize a diversity of perspectives, the open exchanges of ideas, the reduction of biases, and an increased motivation for accuracy.

In this chapter, we discuss some of the common psychological or behavioural factors that influence risk analysis and risk management. We give examples of cases where behavioural biases created a risk management failure, and some ways in which the negative impact of biases can be mitigated. Biases are categorized, loosely, as relating to (i) self-deception, (ii) information processing (both forms of cognitive bias), and (iii) social bias, relating to the pressures created by social norms and expectations. We give examples of a range of common behavioural biases in risk management, and we briefly describe some strategies for overcoming the distortions created by behavioural factors in decision-making. Next, we present the foundational concepts of Cumulative Prospect Theory, which provides a mathematical framework for decision making that reflects some universal cognitive biases.

What is the essence of group decision-making? How does group dynamics affect policy outcomes? This chapter contributes to foreign policy analysis and national security decision-making by advancing a comparative group dynamic perspective. Specifically, we examine three models of group decision-making: Groupthink, Polythink, and Con-Div, and apply each model to the Kennedy administration’s decision to impose a naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We claim that applying different group decision-making models to real-world cases presents a new way of explaining governmental decisions. Based on our comparative analysis of the three models, we find that the Con-Div model performs best in explaining the naval blockade decision.

So far in this book, the emphasis has been on the role of psychological constraints on individual decision makers. In many areas of political science, however, theories deal with interactions between states or within a government bureaucracy, not the multitudes who live within a nation’s borders. The literature, in other words, treats states as unitary actors. In nearly every case of national level decision making, however, we see very interesting dynamics when we look a little closer. We review the challenge presented by principal-agent problems that are common in large and complex organizations such as national governments. BPS helps us understand a host of these influences on state level decision-making, including domestic public opinion, bureaucratic norms and practices, organizational constraints, advisory group structures, and the dynamics of group decision-making, including groupthink and polythink.

Studies have shown that US college and university professors are disproportionately left-leaning and Democratic and these tendencies are especially pronounced in the social sciences. Critics of this ideological homogeneity have leveled a wide range of charges in light of these findings: that these political orientations seep into research and teaching, that it affects accumulated knowledge, policymaking, student attitudes, American political culture, and that it promotes motivated reasoning, bias, and groupthink. This chapter reviews the most credible of the arguments for greater ideological diversity and attempts to move beyond applied concerns by asking whether and how discussion of political diversity and bias in academia might be reconceptualized to form the basis for meaningful empirical studies.

This chapter describes how the world’s first independent air force, led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, reacted to the threats to its existence by maximizing the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) operational utility and financial efficiency, while simultaneously contriving a credible narrative about its future strategic potential. In pursuing these twin narratives, the RAF developed a unique culture of beliefs and taken-for-granted attitudes that thrived because of the conceptually incurious nature of the men it selected to become officers. Few of these technically able "practical men" were willing to challenge their superiors’ intuitive and speculative belief that the morale of civilian populations was especially vulnerable to bombing. Instead, like their leaders, they became consciously complicit in acceding to the societal prophecies, articulated in books, films, and newspapers, that bombing would have apocalyptic effects, and that civil societies subjected to its effects would wish to sue for peace. The chapter concludes by analyzing how this culture impeded the realization that the anticipated outcomes were not being achieved and explains how this stymied options to pursue alternative strategies.