Governance is about execution, the ability of agents to carry out the wishes of principals. Therefore, the question explored here is how appropriately structured is the approach to governance suited for the principals’ aims given the realities of the context in which the universities operate? This chapter focuses on the nexus of two elements, bureaucratic or public sector capacity and autonomy, drawing on the framework of Fukuyama. It finds that the state-extended model appears most in low capacity and low autonomy contexts. But in other contexts with more autonomy and higher capacity different governance structures, such as the civic or internal/external models may be more appropriate. This exploration raises implications for policy makers and campus leaders. First, a group of countries have governance structures that seem out of alignment with their autonomy and bureaucratic capacity levels. It seems like some university systems have excess autonomy that may not be supported by their levels of bureaucratic capacity. Finally, those universities in countries with high capacity and high autonomy might be better served by considering a civic model of governace.

Keeping the focus on autonomy consistent, this second exploration considers the level of competition among universities as a salient contextual element important to governance.. Competition in higher education consists of a set of organizational responses to environmental pressures. It focuses on what universities must do to attract financial resources; recruit students and staff, both foreign and domestic; be part of the global research enterprise, and, for many, pursue world class status and global rankings. It also acknowledges that higher education competition is a Western, market-driven idea.The state-extended model would seem most appropriate when low competition and low autonomy exist in tandem. The state directs higher education, provides the needed resources and may put in place policies that limit competition. Internal/external model of governance is common to those university systems with higher levels of autonomy and where competition comparatively is moderate to high. The academic focused model may be outdated. The civic model is underused in PSS countries, but may be helpful in high competition/high autonomy contexts.

Chapter 3 elaborates our theory of governance in areas of limited statehood. While existing approaches address certain pieces of our “governance puzzle,” none of them offers a satisfying answer. We develop a theoretical explanation for when and how actors are motivated to engage in governance. As to the role of (state) institutions, we argue that the shadow of hierarchy and the shadow of anarchy go a long way to incentivize actors to become governors. The same holds true for the quest for (international as well as domestic) legitimacy and social acceptance. Personalized trust relations within and among local communities not only helps overcoming collective action problems, but also leads to the demand for governance contributions. Next, we introduce our theory of effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood. First, institutional conditions fostering effective governance consist of institutional design, inclusiveness and fairness, and residual statehood. Second, empirical legitimacy and social acceptance of the governors and the governance institutions matter for effectiveness. Last not least, personalized, group-based, and generalized trust constitutes a further enabling condition for effective governance.