Embracing all humanity as one's own is the core of the modern idea of cosmopolitanism, but the present time with rising tribalism, populism, racism, and narrow-minded nationalism is not propitious for cosmopolitanism. At a time like this, the cosmopolitan effort to see cultures and peoples as close to one another rather than absolutely different becomes all the more important. The comparative study of different cultures and literatures may promote a cosmopolitan stance, and from a comparative perspective, we may draw some ideas from the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius for a theory of global ethics.

This essay aims to describe and analyse the important contributions of the Chinese philosopher and diplomat P.C. Chang concerning the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR). After a brief biographical sketch, Chang's main contributions will be presented and discussed. A study of Chang's contributions in this context may also highlight the ethical potential of the UDHR and its great relevance to global ethics and world politics today.

This article argues that the core value of “humanity” (ren 仁) in the Confucian tradition may serve as a resource for global ethics in the 21st century. After presenting three major questions raised by the COVID-19 pandemic, it proposes a “reconciliation” between Confucian and Western traditions for a solution to the challenges of the pandemic. Confucian “humanity”, based on the idea of interpenetration between what is inside and what is outside, may pave the way to a true “reconciliation” in our era.

Robert Baker and Rosamond Rhodes each argue against the universality “common morality,” the approach to ethics that comprises four fundamental principles and their application in various settings. Baker contends that common morality cannot account for cultural diversity in the world and claims that a human rights approach is superior in the context of global health. Rhodes maintains that bioethics is not reducible to common morality because medical professionals have special privileges and responsibilities that people lack in everyday life. Baker fails to demonstrate how the human rights approach to global ethics is more sensitive to culture than the use of bioethics principles that comprise common morality. Rhodes has a narrow interpretation of “common morality,” which when understood more broadly, accounts for the special privileges and obligation of medical professionals.

The book that has most stimulated my life in the law over the past year is Michael Ignatieff’s The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World.1 I write “stimulated” rather than “inspired” because some of its claims are disorientating, others are disputable, and the most important are disconcerting. Despite, or rather due to, that provocation I find the book more engaging. The Ordinary Virtues is a self-described moral progress report amid globalization and as such is a work of sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. However, Ignatieff’s report implicates many important topical issues of international and constitutional law. It should, I believe, inform the thinking of legal scholars on global ethics and public policy today.