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2 results

  • Chapter 1 - Humor, Common Sense and the Future of Metaphysics in the Prolegomena

  • Edited by Peter Thielke, Pomona College, California
  • Book:
    Kant's Prolegomena
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    21 October 2021, pp 9-26

  • Summary

    This chapter explores the complex relation between Kant and common-sense philosophy.In the Prolegomena, Kant is notoriously dismissive of thinkers like Beattie and Oswald, but his attitude toward common-sense philosophy is more sympathetic than these remarks might suggest. Kant shares some of the common-sense philosophers’ worries about the vanities of metaphysics, but sees them as caught up in just the kind of ‘enthusiasm’ that besets more traditional metaphysicians.The essay suggests that for Kant, the proper strategy against either form of enthusiasm is to deflate it using raillery and humor, and the paper is devoted to providing a fascinating literary analysis of the Prolegomena, to show just how the rhetorical strategies of the work can contribute to a greater understanding of the critical project as a whole.

  • Kant on Moral Satisfaction

  • Michael Walschots
  • Journal:
    Kantian Review / Volume 22 / Issue 2 / June 2017
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    05 May 2017, pp. 281-303
    Print publication:
    June 2017

  • This paper gives an account of Kant’s concept of self-contentment (Selbstzufriedenheit), i.e. the satisfaction involved in the performance of moral action. This concept is vulnerable to an important objection: if moral action is satisfying, it might only ever be performed for the sake of this satisfaction. I explain Kant’s response to this objection and argue that it is superior to Francis Hutcheson’s response to a similar objection. I conclude by showing that two other notions of moral satisfaction in Kant’s moral philosophy, namely ‘sweet merit’ and the highest good, also avoid the objection.