On 20 October 1962, a border dispute between India and the People’s Republic of China erupted into open warfare, leaving the Indian Army reeling and the country’s political leadership in a state of panic. A State of Emergency was declared, a National Defence Fund established, and recruiting stations for India’s armed forces were flooded with eager volunteers. This chapter dissects the impact of joint covert action operations undertaken by India and the United States in the wake of Sino-Indian hostilities. It examines how and why the CIA assisted the IB in equipping and training a clandestine warfare unit tasked with monitoring Chinese military supply routes into Tibet and oversaw the insertion of nuclear-powered surveillance equipment on two of India’s Himalayan peaks to collect data on Chinese atomic tests. Coming at a point when new mechanisms for the implementation of covert action where being introduced by Whitehall, including the Counter Subversion Committee and the Joint Action Committee, the chapter also analyses how the border war was approached by Whitehall as an opportunity to test new British covert capabilities and to roll-back communism in South Asia.

Polanyi–s and Galbraith–s analyses of very long-run changes in, and main characteristics of, economic and social structures. It is pointed out how neo-institutionalism is grounded in the traditional marginalist approach, thus sharing its limits, while the evolutionary and institutional approaches, with strong connections among them, are born in counterposition to the marginalist approach. Their contributions, in particular those to the analysis of technical change, are then illustrated. With reference mainly to Hirschman, the cultural element in development economics is recalled. A final section illustrates the –varieties of capitalism–.