We propose a stock market model with chartists, fundamentalists and market makers. Chartists chase stock price trends, fundamentalists bet on mean reversion, and market makers adjust stock prices to reflect current excess demand. Fundamentalists’ perception of the stock market’s fundamental value is subject to animal spirits. As long as the stock market is relatively stable, fundamentalists neutrally believe in a normal fundamental value. However, fundamentalists optimistically (pessimistically) believe in a high (low) fundamental value when the stock market rises (falls) sharply. Our framework may produce boom-bust stock market dynamics that coevolve with waves of optimism and pessimism for parameter settings that would ensure globally stable stock market dynamics in the absence of animal spirits. Responsible for such a surprising outcome is the destabilizing nature of temporarily attracting virtual fixed points, brought about by animal spirits.

We examine how media reports influenced trading volumes and order imbalances on the Sydney Stock Exchange (SSX) from 1901 to 1950, focusing on wool market reports as a substitute for broader financial advice in the absence of a specialised investment press. Given wool's status as Australia's primary export and its integration with various sectors, we construct a weekly media sentiment index based on news about wool sales and auctions from the Sydney Morning Herald. Our findings reveal that positive news about the wool market correlates with increased trading volumes and reduced order imbalances on the SSX. This relationship persisted during significant events such as the UK government's wool purchase plans, the 1929 Wall Street Crash, World War II-related trading restrictions, and the short selling ban.

Our study investigates the influence of the Korean National Pension Fund's equity ownership on voting premiums, revealing a statistically significant reduction. In particular, we establish the liquidity pathway as the primary factor among the three channels previously suggested in the literature. Analysis of the COVID-19 era and the VKospi index underscores this predominance. These findings enrich the literature on public pension funds and capital markets, providing policymakers in emerging economies with a deeper understanding of the dynamics involved in establishing pension investment institutions.

This article studies a previously unknown asset market in eighteenth-century Sweden. It emerged as a result of a partial default in 1719, when large amounts of recently released fiat coins were converted into government liabilities. These could only be redeemed as a customs duty on international trade, the licent. As merchants had to acquire such assets to conduct their trade, tens of thousands of transactions were carried out on a secondary market over a period of more than 45 years. Networks of local merchants bought assets from initial holders and sold them on to intermediaries or merchants, who deposited the liabilities with a newly established government agency, the Debt Office. Here, hundreds of account holders could transfer the value of their deposits between them. When a licent payment was due, the amount was deducted from the merchant's account. Prices on the liabilities were low and sometimes volatile, but the long-term trend was rising. We have distinguished three types of market participants: a small group of very active users, most of them professional dealers or brokers; merchants who traded on a regular basis as they needed to pay the licent, or when a favorable opportunity appeared; and finally, those who traded sporadically. The emergence of this market was part of a financial expansion that occurred in many European countries at the same time, the closest equivalent being the segmented default in France after the abolition of John Law's system. This study aims to broaden our understanding of eighteenth-century financial developments, which have rarely been studied in a semi-peripheral European economy.

This study investigates the impacts of behavioral finance on stock market volatility. The primary aims are to explain the reasons behind changes in the S&P 500 price within the context of behavioral finance and to analyze investor behavior in response to these changes. To achieve this, the research employs time-series analysis over a 10-year period, focusing on the S&P 500, real interest rates, consumer confidence, market volatility and credit default swaps while considering the effects of behavioral biases. The findings reveal several significant correlations: rising real interest rates negatively affect stocks due to loss aversion and sentiment. Conversely, higher consumer confidence tends to positively influence the stock market, driven by herding behavior and optimism. Additionally, market volatility shows a negative correlation with the S&P 500, influenced by risk aversion, recency bias and herding behavior. Moreover, an increase in credit default swap rates leads to stock market declines, primarily influenced by risk perception, loss aversion and herding behavior.

Is it possible to achieve almost riskless, nonfluctuating investment payoffs in the long run, at a fraction of the traditional funding requirement, using equity investments? What is their shortfall risk? These questions are motivated by the need to increase yields, while limiting the variability of investment results. We show how to use contingent claims, denominated in units of a stock index, to achieve an almost riskless investment outcome. To control the risk of the proposed hedge portfolios, we introduce an overfunded scheme and show its reliability using bootstrapping. Results show that a modest amount of overfunding is an effective risk-management approach that brings the probability of not achieving the target to less than 1 percent. Our results are based on the use of the minimal market model and a change of numeraire. Robustness tests support their validity under different market specifications.

There is little research studying the effects of political violence on financial markets over decades, especially in an atmosphere where the violence manifested itself in heterogeneous and geographically widespread ways. This article examines the authoritarian edifice of Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century to examine the way in which capital markets perceived political instability in a country which had paradoxically strong financial institutions but weak political ones. Using a novel database on political violence in Russia in the nineteenth century matched to monthly financial data from Russian equity markets, this article provides strong evidence that Russia's financial markets were negatively affected in the long run by political violence. Consistent with modern views of financial information, the effects of political violence were quickly incorporated into asset prices, but the specific magnitude of such violence was different depending on where the violence occurred and in what manner. Overall, it appeared that political violence was perceived very negatively by investors in Russian equity markets.

Most previous studies reject the basic tenet of the Masters Hypothesis that the influx of financial index investments has pressured agricultural futures prices upwards substantially. However, the impact of index investment activities may be more complicated and nuanced than can be detected by the relatively simple linear Granger causality tests used in many previous studies. Our study applies a new cross-quantilogram (CQ) test to weekly index trader positions and returns in four agricultural futures markets. Overall, we find limited support for a significant relationship between extreme index trader position changes and returns, and even less support that increased index trading activities have pushed commodity prices higher.

This study builds upon the existing literature on the Working curve and backwardation to explore the impact of storage regimes on the volatility measures of substitute agricultural commodity markets. We investigate the impact of commodity fundamentals (storage regime and stocks-to-use ratio), commodity-specific financial variables (options hedging pressure-long and -short), world economic activity, market-wide volatility index, seasonality, and time-to-maturity on nearby and deferred implied volatility (IV) series of selected commodity pairs of corn-soybean and winter wheat-spring wheat. Our work confirms that, in some cases, grain and oilseed IV derived from options premia respond to shocks in commodity (and substitute commodity) fundamentals which are in line with the behaviour of volatility in futures markets. Own-storage regime effects on price variability are stronger in the selected markets, while spillover effects from substitute commodity storage regimes show a modest impact on volatilities. We also find some evidence for the stocks-to-use ratio of both corn and soybean to impact both their own and each other’s IV, while options hedging pressure has some impact only on wheat IVs.

This article provides causal evidence on a long-standing controversy in the finance and labour literature, namely, whether better health and safety in the working environment is in the best interests of firm owners. While, on the one hand, an influential strand of the literature argues that improvements in workers’ health and safety provision can increase costs and harm the market value of equity, another well-consolidated strand of the literature argues that such improvements can reduce costs and create shareholder value. It is empirically challenging to study the relation between the work environment and equity value due to their endogenous relation. To overcome this challenge, I utilize a historic natural experiment that uniquely isolates the effects of mandated investments in health and safety provision on firm market value: on 27 March 1974, the Swedish hung parliament drew a lottery ticket to decide on a legislative proposal that mandated companies to improve their employees’ work environment. The lottery resulted in the approval of the proposal. I find that this outcome led to an immediate and sizable decrease in the market value of Swedish companies that persisted for several days.

This article studies the financial market integration in the 1670s by examining the effectiveness of triangular exchange arbitrage. The results suggest that international credit markets based on bills of exchange in northwestern Europe were well integrated and responded to exchange-rate differences quickly. The speed of adjustment, ranging between one and three weeks, accorded with the speed of communication, but the transaction cost associated with exchange arbitrage was much lower than that of shipping bullion. Although warfare had a disruptive effect on exchange arbitrage by increasing transaction cost, markets were resilient in remaining efficient.

Based on an extensive survey of French primary sources and a discussion of the recent literature on fiscal policy in France and Europe during Louis XIV's wars, this article revisits the rationale behind the first experiment with paper money undertaken by finance minister Michel Chamillart, comparing it to other belligerents’ strategies, in particular England's, to adjust their monetary regime to the challenges of funding long wars of attrition. The article shows how concerns about economic activity, coinage and the need to finance the war deficit led to a series of debasements of the French currency, the establishment of a bank in the form of a Caisse des emprunts and the introduction of mint bills, which became legal tender and caused the first experience of fiat money inflation in history. Whereas Chamillart's personal shortcomings have been recently suggested as the cause of Louis XIV's humbling in the War of the Spanish Succession, I argue on the contrary that the introduction of paper money in 1704 was key to the capacity of France to sustain its military effort, but that a succession of military defeats against a more powerful coalition led to inflation. I also argue that the introduction of paper money saved the Caisse des emprunts and its bonds which helped sustain the war effort up until the peace. By situating the use of paper money within the broader question of the exercise of power in the absolute monarchy, this article examines the formation of fiscal policy, paying attention to the ways in which government sought advice from experts. It concludes by calling for further studies on policy- and decision-making under Louis XIV.

A previously unknown pricing anomaly existed for a few years in the late 1840s in the British government bond market, in which the larger and more liquid of two very large bonds was underpriced. None of the published mechanisms explains this phenomenon. It may be related to another pricing anomaly that existed for much of the nineteenth century in which terminable annuities were significantly underpriced relative to so-called ‘perpetual’ annuities that dominated the government bond market. The reasons for these mispricings seem to lie in the early Victorian culture, since the basic economic incentives as well as laws and institutions were essentially the familiar modern ones. This provides new perspectives on the origins and nature of modern corporate capitalism.

This study analyzes how the colonial rice trade in prewar Japan affected its rice market, considering several government interventions in the two rice futures exchanges in Tokyo and Osaka. We explore the interventions in the futures markets using two procedures. First, we measure the joint degree of efficiency in the markets using a time-varying vector autoregression model. Second, we examine historical events that possibly affected the markets and focus on one event at a time. The degree of efficiency varies over time within our sample period (1881-1932). The observation, together with historical analysis, leads to the following conclusions: (1) the two major markets in Tokyo and Osaka were nearly efficient; (2) government interventions involving the delivery of imported rice from Taiwan and Korea often reduced futures market efficiency; finally, (3) this relationship continued as long as the quality difference between imported and domestic rice existed. The government interventions that promoted domestic distributions of the colonial goods resulted in confusion in the commodity markets, and decreased efficiency of the markets in the metropole.

British government bonds formed the deepest, most liquid and most transparent financial market of the nineteenth century. This article shows that those bonds had long periods, extending over decades, of anomalous behavior, in which Consols, the largest and best known of these instruments, were noticeably overpriced relative to equivalent securities which offered the same interest rate and the same guarantee of payment. This finding and similar ones for other comparable pairs of British gilts appear to provide the most extreme counterexamples documented so far to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and to the Law of One Price, and point the way to further investigations on the origins and nature of the modern economy.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) releases crop condition reports detailing crop progress and growing conditions for various crops including corn, soybeans, and winter wheat. Previous research has investigated market impacts from various USDA reports, but crop condition reports have received little attention. This article investigates the impact of crop condition reports on winter wheat prices at the national level and for a local market. We employ both parametric and nonparametric tests. Results suggest that crop condition reports for winter wheat do not generally affect market prices. This contrasts with results found in corn and soybean markets.

There are a multitude of explanations for the depth and length of the Great Depression, of which uncertainty has been proposed as one possible explanation (Romer 1990). The 1930s not only saw extreme declines in output and prices, but stock volatility was also at record highs (Schwert 1989). This high stock volatility was generated by a series of discontinuous jumps as news about uncertainty arrived regularly during the 1930s, as shown by applying the Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) test for jumps in a time-series. To provide a more historical narrative for these jumps, I outline some key events during the Great Depression that generated a sense of uncertainty for businesses and households which occurred contemporaneously to these extreme jumps. While much of the literature has placed Roosevelt's New Deal as a primary source of uncertainty, I do not find much evidence for this hypothesis, and instead find that banking crises, the breakdown of the gold standard, popular unrest and uncertainty related to the brewing war in Europe were primarily responsible for both jumps in returns and the uncertainty of the 1930s.

This study investigates the relationship between cash and futures prices of soybeans and soybean meal from 1992 to 2013. Error correction models are estimated for the prices of both commodities. An exogenous measure of price variability is included in both models to determine if variability increases the speed with which cash and futures prices return to their long-run equilibrium relationship. This is used to measure the impact of price variability on short-run market efficiency and the price discovery process. The findings indicate that the level of price variability influences market adjustment rates and the price discovery process.

Few studies to date have addressed the relationship between the food industry's environmental and financial performances although the industry is one of the biggest contributors of greenhouse gas emissions. We analyze the impact of environmental news about selected food companies on their stock prices. Results show that positive (negative) events that are the result of direct internal company actions lead to higher (lower) predicted returns, whereas events related to third-party opinions lead to smaller changes in predicted returns in short event windows. This study highlights the importance of conducting the analysis on a disaggregated basis by incorporating firm-level variables.

The first decade of the 21st century has perhaps witnessed morestructural change in commodity futures markets than all previous decadescombined. Not only have trading volumes and open interest increasedmarkedly, but this time period also saw historic changes in both trading andparticipants. The available literature indicates that the irrational andharmful impacts of the structural changes in commodity futures markets overthe last decade have been minimal. In particular, there is little evidencethat passive index investment caused a massive bubble in commodity futuresprices. There is intriguing evidence of several other rational andbeneficial impacts of the structural changes over the last decade. Inparticular, the expanding market participation may have decreased riskpremiums, and hence, the cost of hedging, reduced price volatility, andbetter integrated commodity markets with financial markets.