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3 results

  • Chapter 10 - On justifying neurobiologicalism for consciousness

  • Edited by Simone Gozzano, Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, Italy, Christopher S. Hill, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book:
    New Perspectives on Type Identity
    Published online:
    05 April 2012
    Print publication:
    08 March 2012, pp 207-229

  • Summary

    The authors such as Papineau and Block and Stalnaker mounted a general critique of the thesis that property identities are closely connected to reductive explainability. Kim takes Putnam to argue that identity claims are ideally suited for the role of connecting principles or bridge laws. These identity claims are thus justified by the fact that they enable the reduction of classical thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and in this way contribute to a substantial simplification of the physical picture of the world. Broad developed a view of mechanistic, i.e. reductive, explanation that, in many respects, is very similar to that of Levine. For Levine, reductive explainability is connected with claims about the identity of properties. Frank Jackson has in recent times given an interesting new twist to the debate about physicalism. Reductive explainability in Broad's sense implies reductive explainability in Jackson's sense, but not vice versa.

  • Chapter 7 - Does analytical moral naturalism rest on a mistake?

  • Edited by Susana Nuccetelli, St Cloud State University, Minnesota, Gary Seay
  • Book:
    Ethical Naturalism
    Published online:
    05 January 2012
    Print publication:
    08 December 2011, pp 131-143

  • Summary

    This chapter argues that analytical naturalism of the sort recently proposed by Frank Jackson and Michael Smith does after all rest on a mistake, though perhaps not the one G. E. Moore had in mind when he made the naturalistic fallacy charge. Smith outlines a parallel version of analytical naturalism, in the course of suggesting what is for him the only naturalistic moral realist account of the content of moral belief that can safely dodge the bullet aimed by the open question argument (OQA) against naturalistic moral realism. The chapter explains the analytical naturalist claim that some conceptual equivalences hold between predicates in the moral and non-moral vocabularies. On Smith and Jackson's account, since such equivalences are likely to be unobvious, the theory that countenances them is therefore unaffected by Moore's OQA. On the author's view, the analytical naturalist commits a parallel dialectical mistake.