Tactical litigation is a reality of the adversarial litigation framework that is currently in place. However, there is a difference between the tactical litigation of choosing a forum which may have more favorable law or be more convenient and choosing a forum with the intent to drive the opposing party to failure. The latter has been the issue with some of the tactical litigation that has occurred under the European Union’s framework of lis pendens. While the Recast Brussels I Regulation has alleviated some of those issues, it has not addressed all of them. While some scholars have argued that these issues of lis pendens may be answered by introducing the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens to these proceedings, that is not the case. This Article explores the pitfalls of lis pendens and forum non conveniens and ultimately finds that forum non conveniens is unable to solve the issues lis pendens creates in tactical litigation. Furthermore, the Article finds that forum non conveniens, inherently and acting as it should, has its own problems which echo lis pendens’ own issues in the European Union. Furthermore, forum non conveniens is simply incompatible with the policies the European Union implemented with lis pendens. Ultimately, forum non conveniens is unable to answer the problems lis pendens has created and solutions must be found from within the European Union’s own civil system.

The concepts of jurisdiction and applicable law have been traditionally regarded as separate inquiries in private international law: a court only considers the applicable law once it has decided to adjudicate a matter. While such an approach still generally applies in civil law jurisdictions, in common law countries the concepts are increasingly intertwined. This article examines the relationship between jurisdiction and applicable law in two key areas: applications to stay proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens and to enforce foreign exclusive jurisdiction agreements. While courts generally apply the principle that jurisdiction and applicable law should coincide where possible, there are circumstances where a court may retain jurisdiction despite a foreign governing law or may ‘trust’ a foreign tribunal to apply the law of the forum. This article seeks to establish a framework by which courts may assess the role of the applicable law in forum determinations.

This article provides an overview of the key features of multinational human rights litigation in the United Kingdom, including the development of a tort-based parent company duty of care, the principles relating to forum non conveniens and applicable law and other key procedural and practical barriers to victims’ access to justice. The article highlights some of the actual and perceived limitations of litigation. It also considers the concurrent development of and mutually reinforcing relationship between MNC tort litigation and the field of Business & Human Rights.

The High Court of England and Wales in its November 2020 judgment in Municipio de Mariana v BHP Group1 (BHP) declined jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by victims of the Fundão Dam collapse in Brazil on the grounds of abuse of process. The decision raises serious questions about the Court’s willingness to vindicate the fair trial rights of victims of human rights abuses linked to multinational enterprises (MNEs). In this judgment, Turner J also made obiter comments on the possibility of staying the case on application of Article 34 of the Recast Brussels Regulation (Recast Regulation),2 the doctrine of forum non conveniens (FNC), and/or the Court’s case management discretion.

This article examines private international law issues raised by civil liability cases commenced in the courts of home states against transnational corporations concerning their alleged involvement in the overseas human rights violations. These claims have been particularly successful in the United Kingdom, where in the last several years the framework of Brussels I Regulation (recast) and English common law rules made it appropriate for the English courts to assert jurisdiction over corporate defendants without the possibility of subjecting claims against the parent companies to forum non conveniens control. In 2019, however, the Supreme Court in a high-profile case Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc expressed doubts as to whether England should always constitute a proper forum for litigating overseas wrongs arising from the operations of British multinationals. The article aims to assess how the search of the most appropriate forum to litigate the dispute might impact victims of business-related human rights abuses in the post-Brexit environment and propose avenues for legal change.

The UK Supreme Court's decision in Belhaj v Straw defined foreign affairs non-justiciability and unearthed its constitutional foundations. However, two decisions since Belhaj—High Commissioner for Pakistan v Prince Muffakham Jah and The Law Debenture Trust Corpn plc v Ukraine—have called Belhaj into doubt, narrowing non-justiciability to give effect to ordinary private law rights. This article analyses these decisions and argues that their general approach of subjecting issues involving transactions between sovereign States to private international law's framework is desirable, because the constitutional foundations of non-justiciability identified in Belhaj are shaky. Yet, it is suggested that private international law itself may require courts to exercise judicial restraint on these issues, given its goal of upholding the efficient resolution of international disputes in appropriate fora.

English common law and United Kingdom legislation provide various – overall liberal – jurisdictional grounds for hearing foreign tort claims. The article examines these grounds with reference to recent and ongoing oil pollution nuisance litigation involving Royal Dutch Shell Plc and its Nigerian subsidiary operating in the Niger Delta. Particular attention is given to the factors taken into account by the court in exercising its discretion to allow service out of the jurisdiction in cases of pollution taking place abroad under the principle of forum non conveniens. Following the widely commented decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Corporation, which ruled against the extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute, it is easy to forget that the rules of jurisdiction vary from country to country and that different legal systems apply similar concepts in often radically different ways. Attention is also given to the future development of English jurisdictional law and practice in the context of environmental nuisance.

In Figueiredo Ferraz v Peru the US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, deployed the doctrine of forum non conveniens to decline to enforce an arbitral award against Peru. The award had been rendered in Peru and the successful party in the arbitration sought to enforce it against Peru's assets in New York. This article argues that, contrary to the Second Circuit's approach, when the merits of a dispute are decided in an arbitration seated in one jurisdiction and the arbitral award is then presented to a court in another jurisdiction for enforcement against the award debtor and its assets within the jurisdiction of that court, neither forum non conveniens nor any rule performing the same function should arise.

Party autonomy provides certainty and predictability to the parties, reduces litigation costs, promotes the prompt assertion of jurisdiction by a court, and simplifies case management between different countries. However, the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause cannot completely extinguish conflicts of jurisdiction. Common law countries traditionally adopt discretionary instruments, such as forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions to tackle conflicts of jurisdiction. Both instruments work together in common law countries to create a balance between international comity and effective case management. The application of these two instruments, however, has been questioned in the European Union (EU). This article examines conflicts of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation and particularly focuses on the effect of the European approach in cases involving a jurisdiction clause. It is submitted that the current Brussels regime in dealing with conflicts of jurisdiction and choice of court agreements demonstrates three weaknesses: procedural certainty takes priority over party autonomy; mutual trust and comity override justice in individual cases; and an artificial fragmentation of the internal and international market. It is expected that situations will be improved after the proposed amendment in the Recast Proposal and the Presidency Amendment is adopted, which provides harmonised choice of law rules to decide on the material validity of a jurisdiction clause and the negative kompetenz-kompetenz rule to decide on the preliminary issue of an exclusive choice of court agreement. Although the proposals do not accept the common law instruments to tackle conflicts of jurisdiction in cases with exclusive jurisdiction clauses, it may not be necessary to insist that forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions be adopted where a proper approach has been established to ensure the effectiveness of an exclusive jurisdiction clause and to provide for the priority of the courts in deciding on its validity. However, the European lawmaker should pay specific attention to the improvement of the functioning of the Regulation in the international context to tackle conflicts of jurisdiction in choice of court agreements involving a third country.

The US Supreme Court has recently decided the case of Sinochem Int'l Corp. Ltd v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp. This is another landmark case regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which resolved a long-term split among the circuit courts. A federal court will now be able to decline a case by the doctrine of forum non conveniens without conclusively determining the issue of personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. The decision of the US Supreme Court is laudable in terms of procedural economy and judicial efficiency. However, to reach the decision, the Court adopted a pragmatic approach. The decision does not entirely conform to the nature and definition of the doctrine. Furthermore, the Court avoided the important question regarding conditional dismissal. It is a fair reading of the Court's decision that there is no mandatory order between jurisdiction and forum non conveniens and, in the future, a federal court can dismiss a case either by lack of jurisdiction or by forum non conveniens, whichever is easier to be determined. This case may also have impact outside the area of forum non conveniens.

Plaintiffs, two Panamanian corporations and a Swiss bank, brought an action against the Republic of Argentina and Banco Central de la República Argentina (Banco Central) for breach of obligations arising out of the issuance of certain bonds. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611 (1988)) (FSIA). In the alternative, defendants moved for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The district court denied the motions and held that: (1) the acts of the defendants in issuing, and breaching the payment obligations under, certain bonds were commercial, and the failure to pay on those bonds, which contemplated payment in New York, constituted a direct effect in the United States even though the plaintiffs were non-U.S. entities; (2) the aggregate of the defendants’ contacts with the United States, together with the promise to pay the plaintiffs in New York, satisfied the minimum contacts requirement under the due process clause; and (3) the defendants had not made a sufficient showing to justify a dismissal of the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens.