Kant repeatedly claims his critical enterprise is analogous to pure general logic (PGL) in embodying the self-knowledge of reason. I argue that PGL is self-knowledge in the sense that its claims are epistemically grounded in pure apperception, which yields insight into the form of thinking in general. Kant’s critical epistemology, as distinct from his critical metaphysics, is self-knowledge in an analogous sense: It is an apperceptively grounded inquiry into the form of all a priori thought about objects. I develop an account of the purity, generality, and formality of PGL, which I then leverage into an outline of the apperceptive method that underwrites Kant’s faculty psychology. This novel account of Kant’s critical method distinguishes it from the analytical but dogmatic method of Wolff and the reflective but empirical methods of Locke and Tetens.

This chapter describes Hegel's critique of the logic of the Aristotelian tradition, going back to Aristotle's organon. It argues that Hegel has an immanent critique of this logic, according to which it cannot justify itself in a non-question begging way. It explains why Hegel regards this logic as empirical, even though it is not so in any straightforward way. Some attention to the constitutivism of the Aristotelian tradition, and its interest in the norms internal to certain capacities or faculties we possess. This is not psychologism, in Frege's sense, but it is objectionably psychological according to Hegel. At the close, I suggest that Hegel's critique of Aristotle's logic is effectively the same as his critique of Kantian pure general logic.

There are many schools of formal logic, but in law the term logic is used informally to mean sound reasoning. So when we say that a judicial opinion is logical we mean that is internally consistent and makes sense. Deduction is major expression of logical thinking. Formal deduction takes the form of a syllogism consisting of a general statement, known as the major premise, a specific statement, known as the minor premise, and a conclusion that necessarily follows from the premises. All or most common law cases involve implicit informal deductive reasoning, as in “If an offeree rejects an offer her power of acceptance is terminated. The offeree rejected the offer. Therefore her power of acceptance was terminated.” However, few common law cases involve explicit formal syllogistic reasoning. Judgment is pervasive in legal reasoning, but the role of good judgment is frequently overlooked, partly because it cannot be taught and is difficult to acquire. It is a quality, like grace, that some have and some don’t. It differs from intelligence. A judge can be very intelligent but lack good judgment. Great judges have the quality of great judgment.

This chapter explores Heidegger’s challenge to the claim that logic is authorative in the following sense: Putative logical propositions demand assent and serve to constrain our thinking about nonlogical subject areas such as metaphysics, and they do so because these logical truths are true in virtue of the essence of the logical. The chapter argues that, given Heidegger's metaphysics, his rejection of the authority of logic so construed is defensible. Specifically, it discusses how his nonpropositional theory of the fundamental bearers of truth and his ontological pluralism undercut this construal of the authority of logic. On this view, Heidegger is less interested in revising or rejecting principles such as the law of noncontradiction than he is in defending his right to revise or reject these principles if his metaphysical investigations demand that he does so.