Sanctions are intrinsically complex. Implementation of sanctions regulations often entails navigating an extremely dynamic environment consisting of numerous restrictions and prohibitions, difficulties in interpretation, inconsistent measures adopted by imposing jurisdictions and countermeasures. This has been evident following the sanctions against Russia, often described as unprecedented in scale. The more frequent resort to sanctions further means that an increasing number of international contractual relationships are affected. Financial institutions operating globally are particularly impacted. This is exacerbated by the use of secondary sanctions which remain a controversial foreign policy tool and even subject to countermeasures, for example, blocking statutes. Consequently, financial institutions and other economic operators with an international presence, torn between two conflicting regimes, face an unsolvable legal dilemma. This uncertainty extends to the termination of contracts involving persons or activities subject to secondary sanctions. Although in most cases international (financial) contracts contain sanctions clauses (often under force majeure provisions), it remains unclear whether these can be relied on, especially where the institution’s own jurisdiction opposes secondary sanctions. This chapter presents in more detail what are the practical challenges in sanctions implementation. It focuses on financial institutions and provide recommendations on how such challenges could be addressed.

The chapter focuses on the treatment of causation in Book VII on tort law of the Chinese Civil Code. After some remarks on the role that legislation can play in governing causation, the chapter reviews in a comparative perspective the location, breadth and content of general and special provisions on causation in the CCC. The analysis will show that what the CCC says on causation, and, perhaps more importantly, what it does not say, demonstrate a deep awareness of the relentless dynamics underlying tort law discourses and practices. Provisions on causation in the CCC strike a well-balanced compromise between the need of providing clear statutory guidance and the opportunity of allowing courts with substantial room to maneuver in light of the specific circumstances of each case.

This chapter explores the unbalanced interrelationship between the twin doctrines of force majeure and change of circumstances under Chinese law. It examines key judicial documents and cases, as well as legislative materials (including the Chinese Civil Code), and identifies two factors which not only have contributed to Chinese courts’ excessive reliance on the doctrine of force majeure, but have also plagued this area of Chinese law with dogmatism, arbitrariness and utter whimsy. Such factors comprise a general tendency to categorically characterise a supervening event as force majeure and Chinese courts’ misinterpretation and unwarranted extension of the ‘cannot perform’ test. Through a comparison of the differing judicial approaches to SARS and COVID-19 cases, this chapter suggests that the above tendency should give way to an approach which places the impact of the event on contract performance at the centre of the inquiry and that a broad interpretation of ‘cannot perform’ should be adopted with ‘exemption of liability’ being restored to its proper meaning.

This chapter deals with a single, yet complex and over-arching topic, namely termination of the life of a contract. When a contract is terminated it no longer demands obligations from the parties, although the parties may be liable for damages or restitution. As will be shown, the CC distinguishes between two types of termination: termination proper and rescission. Given that termination produces significant consequences for the parties, the CC sets out general and subject-specific rules. General rules include those on force majeure, impossibility of fulfilment, discharge, set-off, novation and the effects of the death of one of the parties to a contract (among others). Subject-specific rules concern the likelihood of termination in respect of particular contracts, such as leases, deposits, employment and others. The chapter goes on to show that, exceptionally, termination or rescission is automatic, while in the majority of cases one of the parties, typically the debtor, must apply to the courts for termination or rescission.

Chapter 10 largely debunks the impression that circumstances precluding wrongfulness possess particular practical relevance in investment disputes involving armed conflict. Especially in case written exceptions are not available or their invocation fails, states may seek to invoke the general rules of state responsibility to avoid liability. However, the chapter argues that force majeure – despite the impression one might have from its genealogy – has little to no room of practical application in the context of investment treaty obligations. Necessity, in turn, remains an available defence in principle, but its requirements are extremely restrictive and the chances for meeting them are slim. Countermeasures, the chapter finally argues, are widely unavailable due to the nature of investors’ rights granted by investment treaties. Infringements of their rights cannot be justified by way of a countermeasure taken against the investors’ home state. The law of state responsibility, hence, is not a viable ‘safety net’ for states seeking to avoid liability under investment treaties in the context of armed conflict.

Chapter 13 discusses numerous contractual clauses that are often relegated to the “back” of an agreement, but which can have important effects on the parties. These include the front matter of the agreement, definitions, assignment (PPG v. Guardian), marking, compliance with law, force majeure, merger and entire agreement, no waiver, severability, precedence, amendment, mutual negotiation, notices and interpretation.

The wrongfulness of a cyber operation, which would otherwise constitute a breach of an international obligation of the responsible State, can be precluded if perpetrated in some specific circumstances. Such circumstances do not terminate or annul the international obligation, but justify or excuse the specific conduct. This chapter analyses the main circumstances precluding wrongfulness on the basis of the work of the International Law Commission. Hence, it focuses on consent, force majeure, distress and necessity. Force majeure, distress and necessity characterise situations in which a State is compelled to commit an act not compatible with its international obligations. The difference between force majeure and distress or necessity is the absence of the element of free choice in the former; while in case of distress or necessity, the State benefits from a certain degree of choice. Cyber operations conducted as a form of reprisal, either in self-defence or as countermeasures, will be dealt with in the last part of this book.