This paper develops a multivariate filter based on an unobserved component model to estimate the financial cycle. Our model features: (1) a dynamic relationship between the financial cycle and key variables; (2) time-varying shock volatility for trend and cycle components. We demonstrate that our approach not only exhibits superior early warning properties for banking crises but also outperforms commonly used indicators in terms of data fit for decomposition exercises, as evidenced by the higher marginal likelihood. We document three important properties of the financial cycle. First, the sensitivity of the financial cycle to changes in real estate valuations increased during the post-90s period. Second, the sensitivity of the cycle to changes in financial conditions displays volatility and country specificities. Finally, our reduced form estimates suggest that the banking crisis of 1988 was preceded by positive contributions from the risk appetite shock, while the primary source of vulnerabilities emanated from the housing market in the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis.

Financial supervision focuses on the aggregate (macroprudential) in addition to the individual (microprudential). But an agreed framework for measuring and addressing financial imbalances is lacking. We propose a holistic approach for the financial system as a whole, beyond banking. Building on our model of financial amplification, the financial cycle is the key variable for measuring financial imbalances. The cycle can be curbed by leverage restrictions that might vary across countries. We make concrete policy proposals for the design of macroprudential instruments to simplify the current framework and make it more consistent.

Five years after the financial crisis, the global economy remains unbalanced and many of the advanced countries are still struggling to return to robust, sustainable growth. Taking a historical perspective, I argue that this predicament reflects a failure to adjust to profound changes in the economic landscape, which have given rise to the (re-)emergence of major financial booms and busts. The economic developments that really matter now take much longer to unfold – economic time has slowed down relative to calendar time – and yet the planning horizons of economic agents have shortened. The key problems arise from the cumulative effects of past decisions on stocks, and yet these effects are treated as short-term flow issues. The risk is that instability will become entrenched in the system. Policy needs to adjust.