Further investigation of the foundation traditions of Metapontium, focusing on the persistence of much more ancient Indo-European mythic traditions and time-reckoning traditions and the presence of those elements in the bricolage that constitutes the Aeolian mythic system of Metapontium foundation narratives and their relationship to Anatolian Aeolian tradition.

The next debate to emerge concerned the idea of relativism. This was central to the Boasian vision of anthropology. Franz Boas believed that no culture is superior to any other, and his anthropology emphasized this. This idea was taken up by his students, including Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. Opposing this we have Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, who believed that some cultures are superior to others. Another key figure was Benjamin Lee Whorf. His linguistic relativism sought to explain that languages classify differently. This is also apparent in kinship, where different categorizations might imply different ways of thinking.

This chapter offers a reconsideration of the well-known letters–atoms analogy in Lucretius’ DRN. By reviewing two readings of this analogy and then turning to the anagrammatic ‘readings’ of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (who in three unpublished cahiers found significant names hidden in DRN), the chapter highlights gaps and omissions in the two existing interpretations. In particular, whereas the previous interpretations use the analogy as license to focus on either the sound of syllables or the arrangement of letters, Saussure instead allows us to think that the force of the analogy may lie not only in the written or spoken properties of letters but also in their creative power, their performative ability to create new words and denote new objects in the world.

Meaning directs our attention to things – in Part 1, we called this “reference.” Meaning tracks our activity as sensuous creatures – in Part 2, we called this “agency.” Meanings also hang together, with networks of interlinkage that create coherence, where every meaning is greater than the sum of its parts. In this part, we are going to name this coherence, “structure.” Analysis of the holding together in structures, we call “ontology,” or the philosophy of what things are, their being. We identifying two kinds of binding, two kins of ways in which things hold together in the work: in material structures (the meanings-in things themselves), and ideal structures (the meanings-for those things, the meanings we attribute to them). The process of interconnecting the material and the ideal, we call design. In forensics that analyze ontologies and their designs, we look for specific relations. This is to make our analysis more granular. However, heading the other way, towards ontologies with higher levels of generality, we find ontologies encompassed by more general ontologies, or metaontologies. Structures can nest with in structures.