This chapter delves into the politics of factionalism in Gaza, its causes, development, the impact of external factors, and its effects. It surveys the main bones of contention within the Gazan elite, presents portraits of elite families and political personalities, and discusses the relationships between the Gazan elite and outside forces. It focuses on the rise of the Shawwa family and its allies the Busaysus, erstwhile supporters of the Husaynis, who at some point in the mid-1890s turned against them for unknown reasons and eventually were able to oust them from control over the city’s politics in 1898, when the leadership of the Husayni family was exiled by the Ottoman government to Ankara. The rise of the Shawwa–Busaysu coalition, whose source of power was the newly created municipality, was accompanied by a spatial divide of the city between the neighborhood of Daraj where most of the elite families, including the Husaynis, resided, and the relatively poor neighborhood of Shajaʿiyya, the stronghold of the opposition. This led to what here is termed “spatialized factionalism,” a new concept that is discussed at length. Gaza’s factionalism is then analyzed in comparison to late Ottoman cities in Bilad al-Sham.

In this treatise, Bartolus of Sassoferrato explores the phenomenon of factionalism in the fourteenth-century Italian city republics. He gives an account of the local nomenclature of Guelfs and Ghibellines, relating these labels historically to the papal and imperial camps in the contested region of northern Italy. He explains that, nowadays, such labels have only local relevance, not ideological significance. He then analyses the legality of joining such parties, concluding that if the reason for doing so is to uphold the common good, it is lawful.

Far from undermining it, factionalism actually keeps the Islamic Republic state flexible and dynamic, therefore helping its resilience. States, authoritarian or otherwise, preside over societies in which a majority of the population is politically ambivalent. Among those who are politically aware, and even among those only tangentially interested in politics, factionalism allows the state to expand the scope of its ideological appeal. It also prevents political elites from taking for granted their hold on power, forcing them to forge and maintain bonds with intended constituents. In Iran, political power is held among a relatively small group of elites. But this elite is far from static. It circulates from office to office, and groups within it often change their doctrinal inflections, factional positions, and coalition partners. The ensuing dynamism helps the system endure.

The standard explanation for Trump’s 2016 victory is that it was the culmination of a long-term right-wing capture of the Republican Party. However, in 2016, the most consistently right-wing candidate was Ted Cruz. Trump was unusual in that he was the candidate of no faction. Rather, Trump’s low-cost populist strategy, in which he relied on mass rallies and social media, was effective because the factions who backed his opponents could not coalesce to keep him out. Trump won the GOP primary with an historically low share of the vote. This chapter also shows that Trump was not the first to successfully pursue such a strategy. In the wake of the reforms of the early 1970s, a little-known Jimmy Carter was similarly able to capture the Democratic nomination in 1976 on the basis of a low-cost direct-communication strategy. The Democratic Party adapted then to keep future populists out. Whether the Republican Party will do so after Trump remains unclear.

Among the heretics in the circle of violence, the revered Ghibelline hero Farinata degli Uberti explains that the damned see with bad light (mala luce). Farinata is interested only in keeping score between Guelphs and Ghibellines; his tomb-mate is interested to know only if his own son is dead or alive. A deferential Florentine ends up inadvertently inflicting untold pain on these sinners already burning in hell because of an inability for the lot of them to see the same present, to see the same facts. Dante’s treatment of heresy points at a fundamentally political rather than a religious problem. The reason why people inflict violence on one another in their parties, tribes, and faction, is not because the “sweet light” of day no longer strikes their eyes, as if the facts were evident to all, but because of a lack of shared belief. This is the light they lack, the one even blind fathers can pass onto their sons.

Chapter 3 demonstrates why Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni mobilization was weak before the Arab Spring. The author shows how two transnational social forces--transnational repression and conflict transmission--depressed and deterred anti-regime mobilization by embedding diasporas in authoritarian systems of control and sociopolitical antagonisms through members' home-country ties.

Chapter 3 demonstrates why Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni mobilization was weak before the Arab Spring. The author shows how two transnational social forces--transnational repression and conflict transmission--depressed and deterred anti-regime mobilization by embedding diasporas in authoritarian systems of control and sociopolitical antagonisms through members' home-country ties.

Cicero claims to represent all right-thinking citizens, the boni, associated with an ideology of traditionalism, as opposed to the populares, whom he describes as a few seditious and degenerate outliers. This reflects a partisan rhetoric associated with the so-called optimates, even though it rests on the paradoxical claim that there are not two similar parties at all. In De Domo Sua and Pro Sestio, Cicero’s partisan rhetoric construes the optimates as having a monopoly on legitimacy, particularly on the legitimate use of violence as a political tool. In a letter to his brother in 56 BCE, Cicero gives a revealing report of an episode in which Clodius and Pompey were addressing simultaneous, partisan contiones. In the Philippics Cicero reflects on the role of factions in the 50s and attempts to resurrect his polarizing rhetoric in order to brand Antony a popularis and therefore an undesirable leader.

Chapters 3 discusses how the Third Front was constructed. It shows that the Party militarized the Third Front by hiding projects in secure locations, speeding up construction in the face of military pressures, and requiring participants to emulate the Red Army’s strategy of local self–reliance. At the start of the Cultural Revolution, Mao intensified the militarization of the Third Front when he urged ousting capitalist roaders who ostensibly supported changing China into a Soviet–style revisionist state. I maintain that this last form of militarization transformed enmity towards Cold War foes into a struggle against domestic forces, a strategy Mao had successfully deployed in previous instances. Assaults on capitalist roaders were undertaken to attain numerous political objectives. Some workers aired grievances about poor living conditions. Others demanded the right to go home. As for Party leaders, they claimed that critics of the Third Front were allied with foreign agents. The CCP made use of this latter assertion to restore political discipline and revitalize the Third Front when the Soviets appeared poised to attack in 1969. The same Maoist discourse created obstacles to the Third Front’s success by attacking experts and slow development.

Chapter 4 “Demobilization and Institutionalization (1983–2001)” deciphers the mezzo or organizational causes and outcomes of RJ’s institutionalization, which reflected the IRI’s macro or broader changes and continuities. As a revolutionary organization, the resource dependency of RJ on IRP officials rendered it vulnerable to their preferences to convert it into a ministry. Reflecting the IRP’s own trajectory, culminating with its dissolution in 1987, the intensified factionalism that existed between leftist and rightist RJ members rendered the organization susceptible to elite designs regarding its bureaucratization, particularly among IRP rightists who were concerned with its increasing radicalization and influence. While some RJ members vehemently opposed the organization’s institutionalization, the outcome precipitated its transition into a rational-legal administration in three ways. First, as a ministry, RJ achieved greater organizational stability and certainty by delineating clearer and predicable hierarchies, careers, and responsibilities. Second, RJ improved its financial transparency and accountability by subjecting its budget to governmental scrutiny and parliamentary oversight. Third and finally, RJ bolstered its internal professionalization and expertise by investing in recruitment, training, and research.

Widespread destruction and cruelty to combatants and non-combatants alike had been common in previous insurgencies and wars, and re-emerged in the frequent uprisings and coups that haunted Yucatán during the Caste War. Institutional instability, the growing power of the military and the politicizing of the town government with the introduction of elections triggered a proliferation of violent struggles throughout the country after Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821. For decades after Independence, no social group, ideological current or political faction commanded sufficient strength to pursue its interests in the face of rivals or put its vision of society into effect. The clergy, possessor of vast real estate, the military (the national army and the local militias) and the hacienda owners figured as the main power groups. Independence brought, among other things, republican and democratic institutions, including elections and municipal self-government. Few institutions, however, guaranteed voting freedom and fairness. Local elections in particular tended to be fraught with manipulation of results, intimidation of voters and other abuses.