Contrary to a common picture of relationships in a market economy, people often express communal and membership-seeking impulses via consumption choices, purchasing goods and services because other people are doing so as well. Shared identities are maintained and created in this way. Solidarity goods are goods whose value increases as the number of people enjoying them increases. Exclusivity goods are goods whose value decreases as the number of people enjoying them increases. Distinctions can be drawn among diverse value functions, capturing diverse relationships between the value of goods and the value of shared or unshared consumption. Though markets spontaneously produce solidarity goods, individuals sometimes have difficulty in producing such goods on their own, or in coordinating on choosing them. Here the law has a potential role. There are implications for trend setting, clubs, partnerships, national events, social cascades, and compliance without enforcement.

The 2019 college admissions bribery scandal revealed uncomfortable truths about elite higher education and its conspicuous consumption. In this chapter, I explore the legal implications of treating higher education as a luxury good reflecting wealth and status. Like luxury goods companies, elite universities are regarded as owners of luxury brands. Just as companies such as Louis Vuitton, Ferrari, and Hermès own brands that enjoy a high level of exclusivity and serve conspicuous consumption, so too do elite universities. In the minds of many, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale are analogous to Louis Vuitton, Ferrari, and Hermès. This “luxurification” of higher education, however, perpetuates class division and violates the right to education.

Chapter 14 covers legal issues arising in the context of academic research and technology transfer. A brief history of university technology development and the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 are given, followed by a discussion of various issues that have arisen under the Act. The Act’s effect on ownership of IP is discussed with reference to Stanford v. Roche (2011). Its requirements for royalty sharing and US manufacturing are discussed. The area of march-in rights is illustrated through the dispute over Fabryzyme. Next focus shifts to the role of university technology transfer offices (TTOs) and ways that universities have attempted to shape university technology transfer over the years, including through the 2007 Nine Points document and the highlighting of issues such as reserved rights, limits on exclusivity, socially-responsible licensing and price controls. Next, other forms of university technology development agreement are discussed, including sponsored research and materials transfer agreements. The chapter concludes with a discussion of university policies relating to copyright.

Chapter 7 considers the rationale and policy behind the granting of exclusive licenses. It then explores the special obligations imposed on both licensors and licensees when exclusive licenses are granted. Licensor duties include refraining from granting competing licenses in the field (Duncan v. Royal Tops), the exercise of licensor reserved rights (Kepner-Tregoe v. Vroom), and the duty to maintain and enforce licensed IP. The exclusive licensee’s obligations include a duty to exploit the licensed IP, possibly in accordance with a schedule of milestones (Wood v. Duff Gordon; Permanence v. Kennametal).

Maintaining the focus outside of Iran’s borders, Chapter 8 “Lebanon (1988–2013)” investigates RJ’s deployment to Lebanon in cooperation with Hizbullah. RJ’s presence in Lebanon sheds light on three critical aspects of Hizbullah and its relationship with the IRI. First, RJ reveals that, rather than simply existing as a client of the IRI, Hizbullah sought autonomy from it. To this end, Hizbullah aspired to control RJ’s projects, localize its personnel, and diversify its funding. Second, RJ demonstrates how Hizbullah instrumentalized development to advance its strategic and ideational interests. They included mobilizing and socializing recruits, supporters, and voters, spreading political and religious values, and preserving a territorial and social base. Third and finally, RJ illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of Hizbullah’s politicized, faith-based, and distributive development model. While instilling cohesiveness and commitment in some personnel and beneficiaries, it disregarded the priorities and preferences of others, and lacked inclusivity and sustainability.