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1 results

  • Why the Eurocontrol Safety Regulation Commission Policy on Safety Nets and Risk Assessment is Wrong

  • Peter Brooker
  • Journal:
    The Journal of Navigation / Volume 57 / Issue 2 / May 2004
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    21 April 2004, pp. 231-243
    Print publication:
    May 2004

  • Current Eurocontrol Safety Regulation Commission (SRC) policy says that the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system (including safety minima) must be demonstrated through risk assessments to meet the Target Level of Safety (TLS) without needing to take safety nets (such as Short Term Conflict Alert) into account. This policy is wrong. The policy is invalid because it does not build rationally and consistently from ATM's firm foundations of TLS and hazard analysis. The policy is bad because it would tend to retard safety improvements. Safety net policy must rest on a clear and rational treatment of integrated ATM system safety defences. A new safety net policy, appropriate to safe ATM system improvements, is needed, which recognizes that safety nets are an integrated part of ATM system defences. The effects of safety nets in reducing deaths from mid-air collisions should be fully included in hazard analysis and safety audits in the context of the TLS for total system design.