The period 2001–05 represents a landmark in Australia–China relations. During these years, the bilateral relationship deepened and broadened to an extent that few observers had foreseen. The foundation of the burgeoning relationship was undoubtedly the enormous expansion of trade. By 2005 China had emerged as Australia’s second-ranking trading partner and replaced the USA as Australia’s second largest merchandise export market. Bilateral trade continued to grow strongly, driven by China’s booming economy and its surging demand for Australia’s energy and mineral resources. In May 2005 the two countries began negotiations on a free trade agreement that, if concluded, would further bind the two economies. Underpinned by strong trade ties, bilateral political, security, and cultural relations also strengthened and broadened significantly. These were marked by increasingly frequent high-level visits in both directions, institutionalised dialogues on political, defence, and security issues, and greater people-to-people contacts. During the period under review both sides sought to elevate the relationship to a ‘strategic’ level.

Three themes permeate most discussions of Australia’s relationship with Europe. The first is that relations are marked by extreme asymmetry. On one side there stands a large and economically powerful group of states, increasingly organised within the European Union (EU); on the other, a middling power that belongs to no regional bloc and possesses limited international clout. The second is that Australia’s relations with Europe are largely driven by trade issues, especially issues in the agricultural sector. And the third is that Australia’s close bilateral links with Britain are still a central feature of its European policy.

Australia is not part of Asia. Nor is it, as is sometimes suggested, an extension of or an appendage to the Asian continent. In making so unqualified an assertion, one is not seeking to take refuge in the traditional acceptance of continental nomenclature nor in the existence of the narrow straits that separate the East Indies from Australia. The implication is that from almost every conceivable point of view the lands on either side of the Arafura Sea are fundamentally different in character.

There are several factors in the host country and the country of origin that might cause people to emigrate. Pre-existing historical contacts and a favourable economic situation in the country of destination are amongst the primary elements to influence migrants’ choices. This chapter will examine the political and economic developments in England, and in Flemish and Brabantine cities before the mid fourteenth century, and how they created the conditions for the migration of textile workers. It will be argued that the migratory process was driven by the prior intensity of trade relations, the existence of communication and transportation links, and the relative frequency of travel between the countries, as well as the political situation, which led to some involuntary migration too.

The chapter covers inter-State political and economic relations and transactions. Five chapters span diplomatic and consular relations, diplomatic and consular protection, unilateral coercive measures short of the use of force, the law of treaties and international economic law. The first examines the closure of Germany’s Pyongyang embassy, Germany’s call to protect the US embassy in Iraq, Germany denouncing the arrest of the UK ambassador to Iran, the agrément of the German ambassador to Poland, the difference between summoning and inviting an ambassador, Iran condemning the German ambassador, the request of the German embassy in Bangkok for protection, co-locating diplomatic premises and Indonesia declaring a German diplomat a persona non grata. The third looks at the implementation of the Libyan arms embargo and Germany’s enforcement of sanctions against North Korea. The fourth addresses Germany appealing to Iran not to execute persons who were minors at the time of the crime and the German Chancellor’s remarks on breaching international law. The fifth comprises Germany’s proposals in the Vattenfall arbitration and Germany’s support of reforming the Energy Charter Treaty.