Japan has faced a decline in fertility since the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. This study aimed to investigate the rate of pregnancy postponement and its contributing factors, with a particular focus on economic- and COVID-19 infection-related indicators. This study used data from 768 observations of married women aged 18 to 50 years with pregnancy intentions. The data were obtained from two rounds of a large web-based survey conducted by the Japan COVID-19 and Society Internet Survey (JACSIS) in 2020 and 2021. A generalised estimating equation (GEE) model was employed, as well as Poisson regression models for sub-sample analysis divided by year to estimate the year differential magnitude of the contributing factors’ impacts. Approximately 20% of married women with childbearing intentions postponed their childbearing. The analyses revealed that declining income and anxiety about future household finances were significantly related to delayed childbearing, while fear of COVID-19 and infection rate were not. Additionally, the adverse effects of unfavourable economic conditions were stronger in 2021. Notably, age did not influence the decision of pregnancy postponement. Older women postponed pregnancy just as much as younger women. In conclusion, this study confirmed that the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly its related adverse economic conditions, contributed to Japan’s current baby bust. Considering that advanced maternal age is already common in Japan, this decreased fertility may result in the long-term negative consequence of further population decline.

This paper investigates the macroeconomic impact of uncertainty by using three recently constructed US economic uncertainty proxies. Emphasis is placed on examining the informational value of these indicators and their ability to better predict economic activity. We focus on the direct and/or indirect transmission chains of economic uncertainty on US macroeconomic aggregates, the magnitude of the forecast improvement induced by economic uncertainty and the strength of the observed dynamic relations. Our results show that macroeconomic uncertainty can help in forecasting key macroeconomic aggregates across multiple horizons, and this predictive power is economically and statistically significant. The two macroeconomic uncertainty measures anticipate industrial production and consumption directly, and investment and employment indirectly, with a time-delay. The transmission chains for investment include consumption and the stock market as intermediate variables, and for employment consumption and investment. No substantial evidence of feedback effects from real activity to macroeconomic uncertainty is found. Moreover, asymmetry in macroeconomic uncertainty is found to be important. Upside and downside uncertainty produce significant macroeconomic effects, yet downside uncertainty produces the strongest impact. Results from a “news-based” economic policy uncertainty measure are weaker.

There has been little discussion of central bank accountability in recent decades because monetary policy has been seen as an essentially technical problem. Yet, during the 2008 financial crisis and the economic dislocations that ensued, central banks gained considerably in authority—bailing out failing institutions, using unorthodox monetary tools, and wading into sovereign debt crises. At the same time, the financial crisis and the slow recovery that has followed have revealed just how uncertain and volatile the global economy can be—a situation that poses new dilemmas for monetary policy. This article looks at the existing model of central bank accountability and finds it wanting in this new, more uncertain environment. Because the principle of central bank independence involves a very narrow set of objectives—generally focused on an inflation target—and very few opportunities for sanction, the main mechanism for accountability is that provided by the publication of information about the bank's deliberations and activities. In an era of increased economic uncertainty, when central bankers themselves admit that simple rules and models are no longer adequate, a narrow, transparency-based form of accountability is not sufficient. I suggest that we need a thicker, more robust form of accountability that fosters more deliberation and debate, ensures that central banks are answerable to their publics, and broadens the standards by which they are judged.