Entry into terrorist organizations has often been described from an extrinsic perspective, as a biographical rupture. However, the “careers” of activists from illegal Basque far-left and national liberation organizations show continuities, underscored by the players themselves. We used a model developed by Snow and McAdam [2000] to understand the "identity work" that accompanies integration and participation in clandestine groups. Two major forms of identity work characterize entry into the organizations studied: “identity convergence” and “identity amplification”. These results suggest a need to reconsider the heuristic relevance of the concepts of radicalization and tip over into terrorism. They also help clarify the role of both cognitive and affective group identification within the identity redefinition process for the individuals involved.

This paper presents a methodology to support the decision-making process during the planning of ship operations. The methodology is designed with the aim of identifying and providing the operator with the best Estimated Time of Departure (ETD)–Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) window of opportunity to execute the journey/operation between two predefined locations. To achieve this purpose, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) stability criteria are exploited in the process to formulate an operational safety criterion based on fuzzy reasoning as a function of the METeorological and OCeanographic (METOC) and sailing conditions. This allows for the analysis of the set of Pareto routes computed by a weather routing systems relying on a multi-objective set-up. The proposed methodology is tested in an operational scenario in the Mediterranean Sea.

This article examines the relationship between the structure of politico-military movements and effective insurgent engagement in peace processes. Drawing on the experiences of Irish republicans and Basque separatists, I argue that centralized movement structures in which politicos wield influence over armed groups allow for effective coordination between movement wings in peace efforts while providing political leaders with credibility as interlocutors. In the Irish case, centralization enabled Sinn Fein leaders to ensure Provisional ira commitment to peace and to contain schism within the republican movement throughout the peace process. In the Basque case, movement decentralization created persistent coordination problems between wings during peace efforts, while eta’s unilateral reneging prevented political allies from establishing credibility as peacemakers. These cases show that while movement leaders untainted by direct association with armed groups may be more politically palatable than those with ties to “terrorists”, tainted leaders may make more credible partners for peace.