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In this chapter, I argue that my preferred version of total pragmatic encroachment compares favorably to alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment. In section 7.1, I raise the problem of forced choice against the genuine constituent explanation and the practical adequacy threshold explanation. In sections 7.2 to 7.4, I suggest a number of problems for the shifting thresholds view and argue that total pragmatic encroachment avoids them. In section 7.5, I deal with an objection to total pragmatic encroachment that concerns the (in)stability of rational belief and rational credences. In section 7.6, I turn to three more general objections to demonstrate that my account of total pragmatic encroachment can handle them and I explain how the sum of views I argue for coheres.
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