Makes a case for the indispensibility of psychology to developing a sociology at the level of the individual. The pluality of factors affecting each agent include Dispositions, Socialization, Temporality and Situational Contexts.

Saul Kripke famously raised two sorts of problems for responses to the meaning skeptic that appealed to how we were disposed to use our words in the past. The first related to the fact that our “dispositions extend to only finitely many cases” while the second related to the fact that most of us have “dispositions to make mistakes.” The second of these problems has produced an enormous, and still growing, literature on the purported “normativity” of meaning, but the first has received (at least comparatively) little attention. It will be argued here, however, that (1) the fact that we can be disposed to make mistakes doesn’t present a serious problem for many disposition-based responses to the skeptic, and (2) considerations of the “finiteness” of our dispositions point, on their own, to an important way that the relation between meaning and use must be understood as “normative.”

The notion of ‘constitution’ refers to the fundamental architecture of a polity considered as an organised collective structure encompassing multiple levels of agency and a variety of plural institutions beyond the state. A given constitution of the economy provides a set of conditions determining which patterns of division of labour are feasible under the existing structure of the polity, and which ones are not. This chapter outlines a framework for analysing the economic constitution in terms of the relatively invariant constellation of dispositions and interests characterising the existing polity. A given economic constitution is consistent with a limited range of variation of the division of labour and group affiliations, while more radical changes might take the economy away from the existing constitutional arrangement. On that basis the chapter also conceptualises the ‘economic body’ as the pattern of organised complexity arising from the relative positions and feasible motions within the economy and characterising the economic constitution of the polity. Finally, the chapter explores the way in which alternative arrangements of social networks influence the response patterns of economic constitutions to factors of change and provides a heuristic for identifying feasible policy options and transformation trajectories under given circumstances.

The Introduction outlines the book’s conceptual foundations, starting with a theory of political economy as constitution that builds on both economic and political thought to conceptualise the relationships between the economic and the political bodies. Accordingly, the body politic is an orderly arrangement of individuals and groups fitting a collective condition, or purpose, which would at a minimum include the persistence of the political body itself. Similarly, the economic body is an orderly arrangement of individuals and groups fitting a systemic condition for material sustenance and welfare, which would at a minimum ensure resilience of an organised economic sphere. The theory of political economy shows shifts between a focus on dispositional activities (such as allocation of capabilities or resources) and a focus on material and social interdependencies. This dynamic often makes it difficult to identify the underlying unity of political economy. Reductionist theoretical developments, both in economic and in political theory, have failed to address the embeddedness and mutual shaping of dispositions and structures at multiple levels of aggregation in the economy and the polity. The Introduction sketches a new theoretical framework that avoids both types of reductionism by highlighting the close integration between human dispositions and socio-economic interdependencies.

This chapter reviews research at the intersection of psychology and political science that studies how people form political beliefs. We discuss the degree to which people’s motivations shape the beliefs that they form, paying particular attention to the extent to which people’s political beliefs are generated through reflection. Both individual differences and situational factors affect the extent to which people are reflective in political domains. As always, more questions remain than researchers have answered, and we conclude with some thoughts about the most pressing ones that future research should tackle.

Aquinas refers to that in virtue of which the patient is acted upon as passive potentiality; and he claims that to every type of active power, there corresponds a determinate type of passive power. This chapter considers Aquinas’s views on passive powers. The chapter first considers Aquinas’s views on the constituents of material substances that give rise to their passive potentialities for being acted upon. Aquinas holds that material substances have passive potentialities in virtue of both their matter and their qualitative forms. The chapter next considers Aquinas’s views on how a material substance’s passive potentialities are identified and distinguished from one another. Finally, the chapter argues that Aquinas thinks that a substance’s passive potentialities for undergoing action are the same as its potentialities for existing in determinate ways. For example, a pot of water’s potentiality for being heated is the same as its potentiality for being hot.

In Chapter 2 I examine what appears to be a violation of the invariance of laws. Generalisations typically concern the behaviour of isolated systems, while explanations, confirmations, manipulations and predictions concern non-isolated systems. Ceteris paribus clauses, which are often attached to law statements, take account of the fact that systems are typically not on their own. Systems are interacted on and interfered with by other systems – they are not invariant with respect to the behaviour of other systems. Understanding how ceteris paribus clauses work helps us to understand why we can explain, confirm or manipulate the behaviour of systems that are parts of a larger whole. Analysis of the role of these clauses shows that we need to read laws (generalisations) as attributing multi-track dispositional properties to systems. The argument relies on an analysis of scientific practice only and is not committed to more far-reaching claims that are common in the metaphysics of science literature. There is no need to assume a sui generis conception of dispositional modality. I will argue that the modal aspects of dispositions can be explicated in terms of invariance relations.

Paul Horwich has advocated, and attributed to the later Wittgenstein, a “use-theory of meaning” that aims to demystify meaning by reducing it to pure regularities of use. This chapter challenges Horwich’s appropriation of Wittgenstein and seeks to make room for a different conception of the demystification of meaning. It argues that Wittgenstein does indeed aim to demystify meaning, but does not think that this involves any attempt to reduce meaning to something else.