Was Churchill a military figure who happened to have gone in for politics or was he a civilian politician with a military background? His role in the early stages of the war as first lord of the admiralty did seem to indicate that he was combining military, naval and political leadership in his own person: taking personal command at the siege of Antwerp, adopting a ‘hands-on’ style at the admiralty and blurring the distinctions between land and sea command. The problem with the Dardanelles campaign was the confusion over whether it was to be a purely naval operation or a joint military–naval one, and the blame for this confusion must lie at least in part with Churchill’s 1914 decision to bring Fisher out of retirement. Churchill’s sacking was a sharp reminder of the ultimate authority of the prime minister, while his service on the Western Front reminded him that his heart really lay in Westminster. Ultimately, he experienced the war from an astonishing range of perspectives while operating as a lone figure. The war provided an important apprenticeship for 1940–5, but it also confirmed that he was essentially a civilian politician who happened to have a strong military side.

The chapter analyses German strategy in 1915, from the offensives in the east in early 1915, the negotiations with Italy to keep it neutral; the Russian conquest of Przemysl; the German and Austro-Hungarian attack at Gorlice-Tarnow and its consequences; the Dardanelles and the conquest of Serbia in late 1915.

The Sultanate drew upon concepts of martial skill, valor and aggression attributed to the Mongol Imperium and its unprecedented conquests. While idealizing these traits, Mamluk Sultans exploited them to thwart Mongol expansion into their territories. They welcomed renegades from Mongol armies (Wafidiyya) to mimic their prowess while limiting their aggression. Mamluk cadets were imported initially from the Qipjaq Steppe in Central Asia, subsequently from Circassia in the Caucasus, with numerous other regions represented. They were instructed in Arabic, Turkish and Islam prior to being trained in arms. The Mamluk military hierarchy consisted of elite Mamluks imported as cadets in the Sultan’s service, Mamluks of senior officers, soldiers of former rulers restive over their loss of status, and descendants of 1st-generation Mamluks who served as infantry and assimilated into Arabic civil society (awlad al-nas). Advancement through the military hierarchy was marked by endemic factional rivalry in which conspiracy was expected not repudiated. Whether conspiracy enhanced the Sultanate’s military prowess or destabilized its governance remains a debated issue.

Implementing treaties and policy papers, particularly when they are the result of a precarious compromise between multiple international players, is notoriously troublesome in the functioning of coalitions. A coalition grand strategy is shaped by usually conflicting national war aims, which are the products of distinct domestic considerations and strategic views. That is why general agreements are often followed by implementation documents providing an operational framework. These, however, are rarely flexible enough to survive contact with the enemy, as well as unpredictable situational changes. The implementation of the London Treaty is a clear example.

The war entered 1915 with Germany in possession of most of Belgium and firmly entrenched in northeastern France, Serbia holding its own in the Balkans, and Russia in occupation of Austrian Galicia and Turkish territory along the Caucasus front. On the Western front the British Empire provided much of the manpower in Flanders and the Artois sector, but the Germans successfully stood on the defensive against them, and against the French in the Champagne, making the first effective use of poison gas on the battlefield. In the east, Germany joined Austria-Hungary in liberating Galicia, then conquering Russian Poland, only to have Tsar Nicholas II refuse to consider a separate peace. The Western Allies anticipated the pressure on Russia and tried to force the Dardanelles, an ill-fated campaign that left British and Imperial forces focusing for much of the year on Gallipoli, where Mustafa Kemal became hero of the Turkish effort to repel them. In the spring Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary, opening up a front in the Alps and along the Isonzo River which soon became as stalemated as the Western front. On the Balkan front, Bulgaria entered the war in the autumn, joining the Central Powers in overrunning Serbia.

This chapter focuses on Callwell’s role in the inception, conduct and aftermath of the Dardanelles Campaign (1915). Callwell occupied the important position of Director of Military Operations (DMO) at the War Office (1914-15) and therefore played a central role in shaping policy and strategy. He was also a key witness at the Dardanelles Commission (1916-17), an enquiry set up to investigate the causes of the Allied defeat. Finally, Callwell wrote extensively on the campaign, including his book The Dardanelles, published in 1919 as part of his Campaigns and Their Lessons series.

This chapter examines Callwell’s contribution to the ‘naval school’ that emerged as a result of increased interest in matters of imperial defence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It argues that Callwell’s work was distinctive, based on his position as a ‘khaki-clad maritime theorist’, a soldier looking at amphibious warfare from the landsman’s perspective. It also explores Callwell’s time at the War Office, 1903-7, during which he was a practitioner as well as a theorist of strategy. Finally, it assesses Callwell’s literary output during his retirement, especially his writing on the Territorial Army.