Estimates of the elasticity of the marginal utility of income are necessary for determining distributional weights to correct for diminishing marginal utility of income, which is particularly important in light of increasing concern about accounting for distributional impacts in regulatory review. The elasticity is also necessary for computing the social discount rate using the Ramsey formula. Despite many attempts to estimate the elasticity of the marginal utility of income, considerable uncertainty exists about the magnitude of this key parameter. In this paper, we use meta-analysis of estimates of the elasticity from the US and UK to shed light on the appropriate elasticity values to use for both distributional weighting and discounting. Relying on our findings, we tentatively conclude that it is reasonable to base the social discount rate and distributional weights on an elasticity of 1.6, with lower- and upper-bound sensitivity testing at 1.2 and 2.0. This estimate results in distributional weights which appear plausible, and which we believe can contribute to a consensus on how to conduct distributional weighting. Moreover, the resulting social discount rate is within the range typically recommended when the Ramsey formula is used.

A uniform value of a statistical life (VSL) is part of established practice within the federal government. Some people have applauded a uniform VSL on the ground that it respects the equality of persons; takes harm to poor people as seriously as it does harm to wealthy people; avoids expressive harms; and builds appropriate wealth redistribution into regulatory policy. Other people have strenuously objected to a uniform VSL, emphasizing that to reduce mortality risks, poor people are willing to pay less than rich people are, and urging that poor people should not have to pay more than they are willing to pay. Whether a uniform VSL is in the interest of poor people depends on whether we are dealing with subsidies or regulations. In the case of subsidies, a uniform VSL is highly likely to benefit poor people. If we are dealing with regulations, we cannot know whether a uniform VSL helps or harms poor people without knowing the incidence of costs (and benefits).

Benefit–cost analysis (BCA) is often viewed as measuring the efficiency of a policy independent of the distribution of its consequences. The role of distributional effects on policy choice is disputed; either: (a) the policy that maximizes net benefits should be selected and distributional concerns should be addressed through other measures, such as tax and transfer programs or (b) BCA should be supplemented with distributional analysis and decision-makers should weigh efficiency and distribution in policy choice. The separation of efficiency and distribution is misleading. The measure of efficiency depends on the numéraire chosen for the analysis, whether monetary values or some other good (unless individuals have the same rates of substitution between them). The choice of numéraire is not neutral; it can affect the ranking of policies by calculated net benefits. Alternative evaluation methods, such as BCA using a different numéraire, weighted BCA, or a social welfare function (SWF), may better integrate concerns about distribution and efficiency. The most appropriate numéraire, distributional weights, or SWFs cannot be measured or statistically estimated; it is a normative choice.

This paper provides a Consent Justification for benefit–cost analysis (BCA). The Consent Justification is based on a tendency toward actual compensation. A substantial justification for using BCA as a tool is the actual Pareto test, called the Consent Justification, in combination with the net present value criterion for individual projects. The traditional justification, the potential compensation test (PCT), is unsatisfactory on several grounds. In addition, the PCT occupies the uneasy position of being the source of extended criticisms in the economic literature and especially in the legal and philosophy literature. The argument for the Consent Justification lies not only in the deficiencies of the PCT, but also, especially, in a showing through simulation that all tend to gain across a portfolio of projects which is not large but rather robust with respect to errors and assumptions.

To what extent do imposed institutions shape preferences? We consider this issue by comparing the market-versus-state attitudes of respondents from a capitalist country, Finland, and from an ex-communist group of Baltic countries, and by arguing that the period of communist rule can be viewed as an ‘experiment’ in institutional imposition. We find that, consistent with some earlier related work, citizens from ex-communist countries tend to be more supportive of state ownership than respondents from capitalist economies. However, they also favour increasing inequality and competition as the means to enhance incentives. We conclude that, in some important relevant dimensions, institutional imposition (which lasted for about 50 years) had a limited effect on preferences.

Produce growers in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee were surveyed in 2002 to gather information about their decision making in the areas of planting, postharvest handling, marketing, and expected changes. North Carolina has proportionately more respondents with large operations, and Kentucky and Tennessee were more similar and concentrated in smaller farms. Tennessee and Kentucky respondents were less likely to have engaged in activities that were associated with the commercial distribution system. Greater reliance on the commercial distribution system on the part of North Carolina growers is consistent with more produce export activity.