Typically, contractionary monetary policy shocks increase the nominal and real rate of interest, which reduces both inflation and output . In contrast, the neo-Fisher effect (NFE) suggests that a transitory but persistent increase in the nominal rate of interest increases inflation in the short run. In a New Keynesian model augmented with several frictions, including the cost channel of monetary policy, real wage rigidity, habit formation in consumption, dampened expectations, and anticipated monetary policy shocks, we derive analytical conditions that give rise to (or avert) the NFE. We show that the NFE can arise due to the interplay between these frictions, and not only when the persistence of the policy shock is large, or when agents are forward-looking, as documented by the existing literature.

We assess the effects of financial shocks on inflation, and to what extent financial shocks can account for the “missing disinflation” during the Great Recession. We apply a Bayesian vector autoregressive model to US data and identify financial shocks through a combination of narrative and short-run sign restrictions. Our main finding is that contractionary financial shocks temporarily increase inflation. This result withstands a large battery of robustness checks. Negative financial shocks help therefore to explain why inflation did not drop more sharply in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our analysis suggests that higher borrowing costs after negative financial shocks can account for the modest decrease in inflation after the financial crisis. A policy implication is that financial shocks act as supply-type shocks, moving output and inflation in opposite directions, thereby worsening the trade-off for a central bank with a dual mandate.

This paper studies the government spending multiplier in the presence of the cost channel of the nominal interest rate. I find that the spending multiplier of normal times declines markedly when this channel is introduced. The rise in government spending leads to a rise in the nominal interest rate and, with the cost channel, to a rise in the marginal cost and inflation. In turn, this leads to a bigger rise in the nominal interest rate and the expected real interest rate, hence a lower multiplier, than in a model that abstracts from the cost channel. On the other hand, in a liquidity trap, the cost channel makes the spending multiplier larger. Therefore, by ignoring the cost channel, the spending multiplier is overestimated in normal times and underestimated during liquidity trap episodes. Since liquidity traps are rare, however, the spending multiplier is mostly lower than in previous estimates.

The New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) driven by unit labor costs has been criticized for failing to match inflation dynamics and for failing to explain the duration of price contracts. This paper extends recent attempts in the literature to improve the fit of the NKPC, by introducing a fuller marginal cost proxy, unit total costs, that is derived from both labor and nonlabor unit costs; the latter include capital-related costs and production taxes. Borrowing costs are examined separately, as in the cost channel literature. Unit total costs are shown to improve the fit of the short-run variation in inflation and strengthen the empirical support for the role of expectations-based inflation persistence. They also imply a duration of fixed nominal contracts that is closer to those suggested by firm-level surveys. The cost channel becomes relatively less important when unit total costs, rather than unit labor costs, are used as a marginal cost proxy.

We study the conditions that ensure rational expectations equilibrium (REE) determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) in a standard sticky-price model augmented with the cost channel. We allow for varying degrees of pass-through of the policy rate to bank-lending rates. Strong cost-side effects limit the size of the policy rate response to inflation that is consistent with determinacy, so that inflation-targeting policies may not be capable of ensuring REE uniqueness. In this case it is advisable to combine policy rate responses to inflation with an appropriate reaction to the output gap and/or firm profitability. The negative reaction of real activity and asset prices to inflationary shocks adds a negative force to inflation responses that counteracts the borrowing cost effect and prevents expectations of higher inflation from becoming self-fulfilling.