Chapter 3 examines how American fears of “pernicious” Soviet propaganda threatened to undermine Soviet–American relations on the eve of Ilf and Petrov’s visit. The long history of American politicians and government officials equating advocacy of revolution and actual revolutionary violence made a Soviet promise to desist from distributing propaganda in the United States a requirement of the 1933 normalization of relations. In the summer of 1935, the participation of American communists in the Comintern (Communist International) congress in Moscow outraged American officials. But their desire for “friendly” relations prevented a diplomatic break. Still, as Ilf and Petrov found when they applied for visas, American officials exercised caution in allowing authors – even funny ones – into the United States.

The Introduction lays out the basic theses of the book: that it was local revolutionaries, not Mao, who introduced Marxism and, more importantly, political organization, to the countryside, but Mao suppressed these local movements. Moreover, the party was remade by Mao as a far more hierarchical, disciplined, violent, and militarized party than anything imagined in 1927.

Chapter 1 focuses on the key role played by Dutch communist and founding member of the Soviet Comintern Henricus Sneevliet (alias Maring) in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai in 1921. Background is provided on the challenging political and economic circumstances of Republican-era China, and two concepts promoted by Sneevliet with lasting significance for the CCP: the need for a disciplined, Leninist party, and the necessity of allying with the broader Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) movement, known as the “United Front.” Chinese resistance to Sneevliet’s second concept, led by student activist Zhang Guotao, who advocated the immediate establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat, was a factor in Sneevliet’s low opinion of the CCP as a viable political party. This contrasts with his favorable impression of Sun Yat-sen and the KMT in the south, which led to a debate in the Comintern over the viability of mass party strategy. Eventually, Chen Duxiu, the Party’s current leader, ordered CCP members to join the KMT, but Sneevliet was replaced by Russian Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin.

Chapter 2 focuses on the critical role played by Chinese Comintern delegate Wang Ming in the birth of the second Communist–Nationalist “United Front” of 1937 following the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War. It begins with a summary of the first months of the war, with the capture of Peking and Shanghai, and soon the Nationalist capital of Nanjing. This is followed by a summary of the situation for socialism in Germany, Spain, and the Soviet Union, providing context for Soviet support of the Chinese in their war against Japan. Wang’s meeting with Mao Zedong in the Communist Party (CCP) wartime base of Yan’an is discussed, with an overview of his arguments for uniting with KMT forces under Chiang Kai-shek, before turning to a discussion of Wang’s meeting with the Nationalist leader in Wuhan. Zhou Enlai’s appointment to vice director of the Political Department is discussed as a way of pulling Communists into Chiang’s government without recognizing them as equals. In contrast, evidence of Wang’s relative success in developing a political platform around which all anti-Japanese groups could unite in Wuhan is presented. Finally, the eventual abandonment of Wuhan under the orders of Chiang is discussed, and the conflict between Mao and Wang is explored in light of later purges.