In this chapter, the remit of theoretical linguistics is located within the background of a set of theoretical questions. These questions pertain to issues of ontology, methodology, acquisition, communication, and evolution. The overarching field is distinguished from other pursuits within applied linguistics that have a more practical focus but are argued to subsume certain experimental approaches. The first part of the chapter discusses the role of grammaticality and formal grammars in linguistic theory. Here, the issue of whether the rules of language have normative force is introduced as well as whether the target of scientific linguistics is individual languages or some universal core of human language generally. The question of what a grammar is, a theory, model, or some other device, is presented based on a brief literature review on the topic with a nudge towards a certain scientific instrumentalism about these matters. Next, the chapter asks whether linguistics is best viewed as an empirical social or cognitive science. Arguments are presented on both sides. Naturalism and normativity figure prominently in this debate. Finally, an outline of each chapter of the book is provided with an aim to either precisify or reflect on the philosophical issues presented in this opening chapter.

This introductory chapter delves into the inception of developmental cognitive neuroscience, a field shaped by historical inquiries into brain development, childhood learning, and the nature–nurture debate. We trace the origins of this interdisciplinary endeavor, revealing how it has emerged as a pioneering approach to comprehending human development. In this chapter, we dissect the core components of developmental cognitive neuroscience: development, cognition, and neuroscience. We elucidate their interconnectedness, underpinning theories, and evolving methodologies, spotlighting the transformative impact of recent technological strides. Throughout the book, our emphasis remains on the synthesis of these elements, illustrating their collective role in advancing our comprehension of human development. This chapter establishes the groundwork for an engaging exploration of the intricate interplay between brain maturation, cognitive processes, and the unfolding of human potential.

This chapter provides an introduction and an overview of computational cognitive sciences. Computational cognitive sciences explore the essence of cognition and various cognitive functionalities through developing mechanistic, process-based understanding by specifying corresponding computational models. These models impute computational processes onto cognitive functions and thereby produce runnable programs. Detailed simulations and other operations can then be conducted. Understanding the human mind strictly from observations of, and experiments with, human behavior is ultimately untenable. Computational modeling is therefore both useful and necessary. Computational cognitive models are theoretically important because they represent detailed cognitive theories in a unique, indispensable way. Computational cognitive modeling has thus far deepened the understanding of the processes and the mechanisms of the mind in a variety of ways.

This essay investigates pre-battle omens and portents through three interpretative lenses: the ontological turn in anthropology, literary and historiographical criticism, and the cognitive science of religion. The Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC is used as a case study because Xenophon, Ephorus of Cyme, and Callisthenes of Olynthus recorded a uniquely large number of portents. Given that Leuctra fundamentally changed the balance of power in the Greek world, the various omens and portents described by our sources are fully consistent with the normative Greek worldview that signs were sent by the gods before important events. Scholars have been much more open to accepting that, despite some literary embellishment, the Greeks recognized omens retrospectively, but prospective omens are not improbable in a culture that was continually on the lookout for god-sent signs. The likelihood of prospective omens is confirmed by a comparative study of the omens that appeared to members of the Seventh Cavalry and to their Arikara scouts before the Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876. We must avoid projecting a post-Enlightenment understanding of reality onto other cultures, thus devaluing the human dependence on communication with supernatural powers that was so central to the experience of the ancient Greeks.

While Wallace’s fiction is famously “about what it means to be a fucking human being,” there is a consistent strain of posthumanism in his writing that has formed a rich thread of scholarship, from Hayles’ technological lens and Giles’ sentimental reading through to Hayes-Brady’s consideration of the body as object, Hering’s examination of the self as a spatial nexus and Vermeule’s Schopenhauerian reading of mind/body dualism. Indeed, it is difficult to encounter Wallace at all without a consideration of the post-ness of his humanism. At the heart of this posthumanism is an ambivalence about the locus of the self in a deeply networked yet alienating world, where telephones and roads are as much a barrier to communion as they are conducive. Beginning with the most disembodied characters – Wallace’s many ghosts – the chapter draws attention to the ways in which the disembodied self in Wallace’s work – pure consciousness – is limited and impotent. The chapter also examines the representation of the most deeply embodied characters – babies – as the other side of this coin, incoherent and narcissistic. Engaging philosophies of dualism and embodiment as well as drawing on the more recent neuroscientific turn in literary studies, this chapter argues that consciousness for Wallace involves imagining the mind in and of the body. This chapter connects this section with the following one, reminding us that for Wallace the self exists always and only within the world.

Science has become increasingly interdisciplinary, marked by the rapid expansion of social science fields melding with ‘natural’ sciences previously considered less relevant for the study of humans. Psychology in particular now depends heavily on insights from medicine, biology, sociology, genetics and cognitive science and has done so for years. By grounding itself in evolutionary theory, moreover, psychology has moved towards a more mature science of human mind and behaviour. The crime sciences – criminology and criminal justice – are poised to make similar progress. While already interdisciplinary fields, we make the case that the evolutionary and cognitive sciences can unify existing knowledge about crime and justice, can help to pose new and interesting questions to study and can push the fields forward in ways that will benefit not only the scientific world, but society in general as well.

Chapter 1 looks at how historically the concept of economic agent developed within mainstream economics, and how the concept of artificial agent emerged while cognitive science became the successor of behaviorism. Then, considering that artificial economics tries to build realistic models of artificial agents, it introduces the main models of mental architectures that derive from cognitive science, and some recent advances in neuroscience (specially within neuroeconomics, social neuroscience, and neurosociology) that relate directly to the economic and social behavior of individuals. Finally, it reviews some models and approaches that try to capture the cognitive, neurological, emotional, and social aspects of agents in an integrated way.