Dysfunctions in metacognition have been reported in individuals with anxiety disorders. Although recent studies have examined metacognition in other disorders, how dysfunctional metacognition compares across disorders is not clear. This review aimed to ascertain the importance of dysfunctional metacognition in various psychopathologies, and to identify similarities and differences in metacognitive profiles across disorders.

Forty-seven studies were selected from 586 articles published between 1990 and August 2015, including a total sample of 3772 patients and 3376 healthy individuals. Studies that measured metacognition using the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ) and its variants were included. We conducted five meta-analyses including 49 to 55 effect sizes, comparing psychiatric patients to healthy individuals on respective metacognitive dimensions of the MCQ.

We found elevated metacognitive dysfunctions in patients, as a group, on all MCQ dimensions. Group effects were large and robust for the two negative beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts, and beliefs about the need to control thoughts), and moderate and unstable for the positive beliefs. Patients showed decreased cognitive confidence and heightened cognitive self-consciousness on moderate to large levels. Moderator analyses revealed that negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger of thoughts were most prevalent in generalized anxiety disorder, whereas heightened cognitive self-consciousness was more characteristic in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder and eating disorders manifested more similar metacognitive profiles than other disorders.

Our findings supported dysfunctional metacognition as common processes across psychopathologies, with certain dimensions being more prevalent in particular disorders.

We investigated whether source-monitoring deficits (here a discrimination between imagined and performed actions) underlie hallucinations among patients with a history of hallucinations in the course of their alcohol dependence.

We assessed 29 patients with alcohol dependence who had no history of hallucinations during their course of alcoholism and 29 patients with a history of at least one episode of hallucinations of any modality during their course of alcohol dependency. The control group consisted of 24 healthy participants. Participants were assessed with an action memory task. Simple actions were presented to the participants verbally or non-verbally. Some actions were performed physically and others were imagined. In the recognition phase, participants were asked whether the action was presented verbally or non-verbally (action presentation type discrimination) and whether the action was performed or imagined (self-monitoring). A confidence score related to self-monitoring responses was also obtained.

Alcoholics with a history of hallucinations misremembered imagined actions as perceived ones more frequently than patients without hallucinations, but not the reverse. Only patients with a history of hallucinations committed more errors of this type than healthy subjects. There were no group differences regarding discrimination between an action presentation type. Both clinical groups committed errors with a higher degree of confidence than healthy subjects.

Our results tentatively suggest that a specific type of source-monitoring deficit (i.e. confusing imagery with reality) may be involved in the hallucinations in patients with alcohol dependence. The findings are discussed in the light of a transdiagnostic approach to hallucinations.