Between 2016 and 2020, Australia began to feel the effects of international pressure on climate change and struggled to articulate a convincing public case that its failure to take decisive action was consistent with national interests and values. This chapter asks how and why the government found itself in this seemingly unsustainable position, and the role that Australia’s approach to climate change played in its foreign policy more generally. It first discusses Australia’s approach to the international climate regime and the commitments made under the Paris agreement, before examining the impact of the leadership change from Turnbull to Morrison and election outcomes within Australia. The third section examines the domestic pressure for political action on climate change, especially during the 2019–20 bushfires and their aftermath, before shifting to a focus on the international pressure that Australia faced. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the state of climate politics and policy in Australia, and the possibility of moving beyond the ‘toxic politics’ of climate change that have long plagued Australia’s engagement with this issue.

Using a dynamic version of the principal–agent model this chapter develops a theoretical framework for an international bureaucracy’s influence on the delegation of responsibilities by the organization’s member states. It argues that this influence is reinforced by external resource flows that both directly and indirectly strengthen the role of the bureaucracy. The chapter uses the case of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to test the hypotheses since its major resource flows have been driven solely by a private market for emissions credits, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Between 2006 and 2013 when CDM revenues formed a significant share of the secretariat’s budget, rule-setting was increasingly dominated by the secretariat. When the crash of prices for CDM credits from 2012 onward reduced the secretariat’s revenues and projects to assess, secretariat-led rule-setting intensified. This approach was used to “buy time” in which secretariat leaders were hoping for a recovery of the CDM market. But when this recovery did not materialize, the secretariat started to lay off support staff and implicitly tried to reorient CDM resources for support of the Paris Agreement negotiations and implementation of national mitigation action.

Focusing on three initiatives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat – the Momentum for Change Initiative, the Lima–Paris Action Agenda, and the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action – this chapter studies how an international environmental bureaucracy can evolve from a low-key and servant-like secretariat to an actor in its own right. It argues that international environmental secretariats increasingly take on the role of an orchestrator that seeks to shape policy outcomes through changing the behavior of others. Using orchestration as a conceptual lens, the chapter identifies new types of influence of international bureaucracies. The forms of influence that the UNFCCC Secretariat exerts include in particular (i) awareness-raising, (ii) norm-building, and (iii) mobilization. This new way of how soft power is deployed underscores the increasingly proactive role of the UNFCCC Secretariat. The chapter concludes that the UNFCCC Secretariat is currently “loosening its straitjacket” by gradually expanding its original mandate and spectrum of activity. It is no longer a passive bystander but has adopted new roles and functions in the global endeavor to cope with climate change.

This chapter illustrates how economists have traditionally thought about decarbonisation. It notably provides an overview of the structure and key assumptions of Integrated Assessment Models, the main tool used by economists to model climate–economic interactions, with the aim of discussing their main policy lessons with regard to the macroeconomic implications of decarbonisation.

Companies are advocating in favor of Paris-aligned climate policies and the majority of companies are not holding their trade associations accountable for their lobbying on climate policy. This is contrary to the fact that many companies have the correct risk management and governance systems in place to manage economic threats from climate change. Following Ceres’s theory of change, the impetus for the project was to engage in an action that would result in short-, medium-term outcomes, and ultimately resulting in a long-term impact. For the responsible policy engagement project, Ceres took action to identify the misalignment between what corporations state they are doing on climate change, and whether their policy actions represent those statements, in hopes to influence companies to better align their lobbying practices in the short term. In the medium term, the goal is more ambition climate policy adoption across the United States, thus impacting the long-term goals of overall emissions reduction.

This chapter shows how successive UK governments have applied a first-best-world neoclassical approach to climate policy: one that understands risk as something that can be calculated, modelled, and integrated within market mechanisms by essentially rational market actors. This was not just the economics that gave us the Global Financial Crisis, the chapter shows that the underlying Rational Expectations and Efficient Markets hypotheses are the market analogues to Soviet theories of optimal planning, and built on the same ontological and epistemological fallacies. The chapter explores how dependence on closed-system reasoning condemns government to ‘write out’ the uncertain dynamics of the climate emergency and the precautionary principle that should follow. The empirical section shows how successive governments of New Left and New Right have implemented regulatory and market-making policies built on the assumption that market agents not only can but will behave rationally in the face of future risk. They have also relied on carbon budgeting, forecasting and audit as dependable methods of risk management, though such methodologies are only coherent in a closed-system world.

Building on the previous chapters, this chapter compares state and society funded climate policy evaluation with a view to the three foundational ideas of polycentric governance, namely self-organization, context and interactions between governance centers. While self-organization through climate policy evaluation is limited, the comparison reveals that society-funded evaluations engaged more deeply with the context of climate policy than the state-funded ones. Society-funded evaluation also used more evaluation criteria in their work. But state funders appear to have greater levels of resources, which manifest in terms of the numbers of methods that they use, as well as more quantitative comparability metrics. The latter may help to carry insights from one governance center to another. On the whole, society and state funded evaluation therefore appear complementary, each uniquely contributing to polycentric climate governance. However, in both groups, there remains ample room for development with a view to leveraging the synergies of polycentric governance by the means of evaluation.

Of the 618 climate policy evaluations collected for this research, only 84 were society-funded. This means that while self-organization represents not only a theoretical possibility but also an empirical reality, the capacities for doing so are limited. Environmental groups are particularly active in climate policy evaluations, while research institutes and private-sector consultancies also contribute. These evaluations engage with context to a moderate degree, and their level of reflexivity, or critical engagement with extant policy targets, is not as high as polycentric governance scholars may expect. Interestingly, only about a quarter of the society-funded evaluations identified and addressed gaps left by state-funded evaluation. In sum, while self-organization thus manifests through climate policy evaluation, there remains great potential for greater engagement of societal actors. This type of engagement is not only be desirable from a polycentric, but also from a democratic perspective.

This chapter presents a detailed analysis of state-funded evaluations collected for this research. State-funded evaluations are by definition not self-organized, and they comprise the lion’s share of the 618 climate policy evaluations unearthed between 1997 and 2014 at the EU level, in Germany and in the United Kingdom. The chapter presents an analysis conducted with a novel coding scheme and demonstrates the growth of state-funded evaluations in number over time, as well as the fact that most evaluation remain within their own governance center in terms of funding, evaluating and the policy on which they focus. There is a strong focus on certain types of climate policy, notably renewables, cross-sectoral and energy efficiency. However, legal requirements for evaluation are not the main drivers. State-funded evaluations show a cursory treatment of context, and limited realized potential for driving interaction across governance-centers.

The European Union, Germany and the United Kingdom have been characterized as leaders in policy evaluation, including in the area of environment and climate policy. The first approaches to evaluation emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, as the EU started dispersing funding to new Member States and various types of reforms demanded more efficient and effective government action. Unpacking such developments, this paper focuses on the historical development of policy evaluation at the EU level, as well as in Germany and in the United Kingdom. It focuses particularly on the actors and institutions that have advanced evaluation, especially the area of environment and climate policy evaluation. The chapter closes with what we know about evaluation in these three jurisdictions and the three foundational ideas of polycentric governance, namely self-governance, context and interactions between governance centers. It provides the starting point for the empirical exploration in this book.

The Introduction discusses the relevance of federalism to different aspects of climate governance. Drawing on the existing literature, we review the key advantages and disadvantages that federalism may offer for the adoption of ambitious climate policies.

This chapter reflects on key findings in this book and how they enhance understanding of the relationship between climate governance and federalism around the world. federalism and federal-type arrangements work in crosscutting ways, facilitating climate governance in some respects, hindering it in others. Divided jurisdiction’s effects vary according to a range of institutional, political, social, economic and geographic factors.