This chapter addresses the limitations potentially placed on the success of revolutions by “human nature” - which in psychological terms are the hard-wired characteristics that limit change in behavior. It is argued that in the long term, even behaviors that we conceptualize as hardwired at present tend to change (particularly through changes in the environment). The avowed goals of the French, Russian, Chinese, Cuban, and Iranian revolutions are examined, and it is concluded that none of these revolutions achieved their goals. Despite failure, the regimes that survive in China, Cuba, and Iran continue to use the rhetoric of revolution. Four ways in which human nature seems to doom revolutions are considered: extremists come to power; an “ends justify the means” approach is adopted and corruption results; the style of leader–follower relations persist after revolutions, with the result that one dictatorship replaces another; and revolutionaries typically fail to set up the necessary conditions to achieve the behavioral changes necessary to reach their revolutionary goals (such as collectivization).

This chapter concludes with a summary of the work, as well as a discussion of the implications thereof. In particular, the book identifies implications for research on civil wars and insurgencies, governance and statebuilding, as well as revolution. Critically, if some forms of rebel governance are not directly related to rebels’ military strategy in that they do not necessarily confer resources and recruits, then the consequences of rebel governance institutions are not yet fully known. This chapter suggests instead that the consequences of rebel groups imitating burdensome governance learned from the Chinese Communist Party can affect international politics, national institutions, subnational social cohesion, and individual behavior in ways that have implications for scholars and policy practitioners. The chapter then discusses how the findings of this work relate to research on governance and state formation and calls for a greater synthesis of scholarship on these topics. Finally, it reviews the importance of governance to revolutionaries generally, beyond rebel groups, and demonstrates that learning and imitation about how to govern for revolution has persisted for centuries.

The MCP’s discourse and activities show its hybrid nature as both a Chinese association and a communist party. In practice, the MCP’s double rootedness in Malaya and China as a Chinese association was achieved through the mechanisms of interwar globalization, that is, the discursive practices of the internationalization of both the Chinese snd Malayan revolutions as well as the attempt to indigenize the MCP. As the only Malayan Chinese association, the MCP both embraced the movement for Chinese rights in the British colony and campaigned for the overthrow of the Malayan and Chinese governments. The MCP’s Malayanization discourse mirrored British preferential policies toward Malays, whereas the Comintern’s rhetoric of colonial emancipation resonated with the MCP’s discourse of the emancipation of oppressed peoples by the Chinese, which echoed Sun Yatsen’s ideas. Different policies toward immigrant Chinese in Indonesia and Malaya resulted in different outcomes in the relationship between Chinese immigrants and indigenous nationalism. Yet, similarly, Chinese political parties in Indonesia (including leftist) embraced the national indigenous identity while also retaining a Chinese identity.

The MCP’s discourse and activities show its hybrid nature as both a Chinese association and a communist party. In practice, the MCP’s double rootedness in Malaya and China as a Chinese association was achieved through the mechanisms of interwar globalization, that is, the discursive practices of the internationalization of both the Chinese snd Malayan revolutions as well as the attempt to indigenize the MCP. As the only Malayan Chinese association, the MCP both embraced the movement for Chinese rights in the British colony and campaigned for the overthrow of the Malayan and Chinese governments. The MCP’s Malayanization discourse mirrored British preferential policies toward Malays, whereas the Comintern’s rhetoric of colonial emancipation resonated with the MCP’s discourse of the emancipation of oppressed peoples by the Chinese, which echoed Sun Yatsen’s ideas. Different policies toward immigrant Chinese in Indonesia and Malaya resulted in different outcomes in the relationship between Chinese immigrants and indigenous nationalism. Yet, similarly, Chinese political parties in Indonesia (including leftist) embraced the national indigenous identity while also retaining a Chinese identity.

During the interwar period, Chinese networks in the Nanyang developed within the trajectories of Chinese mass labor migration, which had begun in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as that of Chinese nationalism. Organizational forms circulated within international Chinese revolutionary anti-imperialist networks in Europe, the United States, and Southeast Asia. The indigenizing efforts of the Chinese Nationalist Party, the Guomindang, and the Comintern’s making of a world revolution overlapped in Southeast Asia. The early days of Chinese communist organizations in Malaya were shaped by ideas of Asianism as well as by the indigenization and internationalism of the Guomindang, expressed in the idea of a regional International of Nationalities. The indigenization and internationalization trends of the two Chinese parties, the GMD and the CCP, were shaped by the interwar global moment and contributed to the establishment of an independent Malayan communist organization. The MCP leaders promoted organization by three ethnic parties, Chinese, Malay, and Indian, which was not only logical for the Malayan multiethnic environment but was also built on the American communist experience.

Chinese immigrant communists who were members of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) invented the national discourse of a multiethnic Malayan nation in 1930 through the medium of a semantic slippage of the Chinese word minzu (nation, nationality, ethnic group). The MCP, which mixed elements of a traditional Chinese association and a Bolshevik party, was a product of the ideological and organizational hybridization common to anti-imperialist organizations in Southeast Asia in the interwar global moment. The Malayan nationalism of the MCP built on the official nationalism of the British government and was shaped by Comintern ideas concerning the internationalism of national communist parties and by the need for political inclusion of immigrants in the Malayan body politic. This idea of a Malayan nation wherein nationalism and internationalism did not contradict each other was a derivative discourse originating in colonialism, though it became central to the Malayan nation after independence. The heterogeneous origins of the Malayan national concept highlight the ambiguities of nationalism and help us understand why this concept is still under debate today.