As the idiom goes, birds of a feather flock together. This ancient proverb is frequently used to portray the phenomenon of people associating with those with have similar characteristics and tastes. However, in the name of weiquan lawyers, myriad lawyers flock together with different beliefs and diverse values. Within this pool of lawyers, in addition to those lawyers who are driven by public interest, some lawyers who have eagerly labelled themselves as weiquan lawyers are profit-oriented in nature. This paper aims to provide a new typology to present a better understanding of the role of weiquan lawyers, by jointly taking into consideration the lawyers’ motivations and adaptive strategies. In this regard, weiquan lawyers in China can be categorized into four ideal types: routine practitioners, rational activists, progressive reformers, and cynical criticizers.

The literature on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has argued for the general advantages of courts’ providing mediation services. However, courts’ involvement in mediation cannot always be justified by those advantages, unless (1) the mediation process is a consensual procedure based on party autonomy and (2) where the initiation is mandatory, the courts’ allocation of cases is justified both by the public interest and a case selection system. In this context, this article empirically tests whether the established arguments from ADR theory can be applied to justify all Chinese court-annexed mediation practices. This study provides a negative answer, owing to the fact that some Chinese court-annexed mediation practices found in the fieldwork aim mainly at clearing dockets and achieving case management for the courts’ organizational interests. Offsetting the advantages, those Chinese court-annexed mediation practices prevent disputants from gaining access to the official adjudication procedure.

Chinese judicial practice demonstrates great diversity in enforcing exclusive jurisdiction clauses. In practice, the derogation effect of a valid foreign jurisdiction clause is frequently ignored by some Chinese courts. It may be argued that these Chinese courts fail to respect party autonomy and international comity. However, a close scrutiny shows that the effectiveness of an exclusive jurisdiction clause has close connections with the recognition and enforcement of judgments. If the judgment of the chosen court cannot be recognized and enforced in the request court by any means, the request court may take jurisdiction in breach of the jurisdiction clause in order to achieve justice. Chinese judicial practice demonstrates the inevitable influence of the narrow scope of the Chinese law in recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It is submitted that the Chinese courts do not zealously guard Chinese jurisdiction, or deliberately ignore party autonomy and international comity. Instead, the Chinese courts have considered the possibility of enforcement of judgments and the goal of justice. Applying the prima facie unreasonable decision test is the best the courts can do in the specific context of the Chinese law. The status quo cannot be improved simply by reforming Chinese jurisdiction rules in choice of court agreements. A comprehensive improvement of civil procedure law in both jurisdiction rules and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is needed.