Witchcraft is a fascinating subject on which many volumes continue to be published. But not in Canada. This article stands in contrast to earlier Canadian pieces on witchcraft whose primary goals were to prove that the witchcraft provision marginalized women and to encourage legislators to repeal it. Parliament finally repealed the Canadian witchcraft prohibition in 2018. The moment is thus ripe to ask how—and why—this legislative oddity migrated from England into Canada. The first section of the paper considers the religious origins of the witchcraft prohibition in England and how it made its way into the Canadian Criminal Code. The second section explores how the prohibition evolved from one against unwanted spiritual practices to one against unwanted economic practices. The last section of the paper considers how witchcraft morphed into a viable Charter defence based on freedom of religion and why the prohibition against it was eventually repealed. In conclusion, the article reflects on the peculiar trajectory of witchcraft in Canada and what it might suggest not only about Canadian criminal law, but also about broader Canadian society.

Religious freedom is protected by section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Historically, the right has been understood in individual terms, though the courts have acknowledged a collective dimension to religion as expressed in a community of believers. Yet, the precise meaning of collective religious freedom has not been fully fleshed out. The current case law only encompasses a limited range of forms of collective religious expression and does not articulate a coherent theory as to why some collective 2(a) claims succeed while others fail. This paper draws on concepts from interpretive sociology to help clarify the existing jurisprudence and reveal a tension that is otherwise invisible over the status of volition/voluntariness in the collective religious freedom framework. Addressing this tension can help rationalize the Court’s jurisprudence and give resources to critics looking to change how the law encompasses collective religious experience.

After a judge declared its parentage regime violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in 2016, Ontario passed the All Families Are Equal Act (AFAEA), which recognized LGBTQ families and parents of children born through assisted reproduction. This article analyzes the legislative hearings on the AFAEA, and highlights three factors that shaped the final policy outcome: a coordinated group of progressive witnesses with legal expertise; the presence of “rights talk” to inflate the scope of the judicial ruling; and the government’s use of the Charter as both “shield” and “sword” to minimize conservative opposition. This highlights how the Charter can shape policy outcomes not just in the courtroom, but also during the lawmaking process. It also demonstrates that activists are now using the Charter—particularly the equality rights provisions—to change policy for two groups facing discrimination: trans parents and individuals using assisted reproduction.

This article examines the effect of two recent constitutional decisions that have altered the course of assisted-reproduction policy in Canada: Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2010) and Pratten v British Columbia (2011). Together, the cases link a socially liberal conception of morality in federalism cases with an interventionist view of the state in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms cases. This could result in a trend toward judicially mandated provincial, as opposed to federal, government action. These cases also provide further evidence of the judicialization of politics in Canada, whereby controversial moral and public-policy issues are increasingly determined in the courtroom.

European Court of Human Rights – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – ‘Hate speech’ – Féret – Le Pen – Keegstra – Commonalities between Canadian and ECtHR jurisprudence –Development of uniform test of incitement – Sharp distinction from US Supreme Court jurisprudence on freedom of expression

In the past two decades the Supreme Court of Canada made apparently contradictory rulings on mandatory retirement. In 1982, the Court ruled that mandatory retirement for firefighters at age 60 violated provincial human rights laws; in 1990, it found that forced retirement for university faculty and others at age 65 was constitutional. An analysis of the decisions shows that the Court relied on the stereotype of older workers as being less competent than younger workers, and failed to provide older workers with protection against age-based discrimination. A number of the key mandatory retirement cases deal with university faculty and may yet have unanticipated consequences, such as strengthening the role of academic tenure. The unwillingness of the Supreme Court to eliminate mandatory retirement means that ad hoc arrangements driven by changing life cycles, employer needs, demographic changes and legislative actions will continue to arise.