Treaty bodies fulfil a range of functions, from promotional activities to monitoring and adjudicating complaints. These tasks, which are taken for granted today, are the result of states’ willingness to vest treaty bodies with the mandate of monitoring compliance. This constituted a remarkable shift away from earlier notions of sovereignty in a system where states were, essentially, the sole authors, interpreters and enforcers of rights and obligations. What accounts for this change and why do states agree to be part of such regimes? This question, which has attracted considerable attention in recent years, poses a particular challenge because it does not seem to conform to the realist views that used to hold considerable sway in international relations, according to which states use institutions as a means to exercise power. Alternative theories emphasise states’ interests or point to ‘acculturation’. This denotes a process of interaction of various actors which generates a pull to build and join credible human rights mechanisms as part of an international order. Indeed, these mechanisms form part of broader international institution building, particularly at the UN level.

A comprehensive discussion of the UN’s human rights work and institutions is an infinite task given that every atom of the Organisation is engaged in one way or another in the promotion or protection of rights. As a result, a large part of this chapter is devoted to the examination of the principal human rights institution, the Human Rights Council (HRC), and the various mechanisms operating under its wing. This includes a discussion of the universal periodic review (UPR), the HRC’s complaint procedure, as well as its so-called special procedures. The chapter then goes on to analyse the important human rights dimension of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC, since both possess authority to take direct action against violations, in addition to their standard-setting capacity. Institutions that have produced important human rights work, but whose mandate is otherwise peripheral to human rights, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), are mentioned in this chapter but are not extensively analysed. Equally, space precludes us from examining specialised agencies such as UN International Children’s (Emergency) Fund (UNICEF) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

This chapter will introduce the CRPD Committee and analyse the extent to which the Committee has identified the presence of hierarchies at work. It will first introduce the CRPD Committee, then Sections II–IV will analyse its jurisprudence. Section II will analyse the Concluding Observations (COs) on States Parties to the CRPD to illustrate how the CRPD Committee accepts that there is a hierarchy of impairments in law and practice and that is having a tangible impact upon how the right to work is exercised by different impairment groups. While the CRPD Committee’s critique of the hierarchy of impairments at work is positive, there are substantial inconsistencies across COs. The CRPD Committee aims to have ability equality mainstreamed, and disability apartheid abolished; to advance this agenda, the CRPD Committee should ensure consistency across COs to empower those on the right side of the disability debate.