This article proposes a theoretical framework for explaining the motivations behind the early adoption of international public policy innovations. While there has been a proliferation of transnational policy diffusion studies, there is less research on why some governments become early adopters when new international policy norms are promoted. Most research on the topic looks only at monocausal explanations without considering their interactions in a coherent, integrated framework. The article proposes four motivations for early adoption: normative, reputation, competition, and locking-in. The framework is then illustrated by application to the early adoption of business and human rights policy innovations, with Colombia and Ecuador serving as two cases for comparative analysis. The article advances understanding of early adoption and policy diffusion by highlighting particularly important explanations for what motivates early adopters to begin processes of subsequent diffusion and suggesting how motivations may interact to strengthen the case for early adoption.

Human rights due diligence (HRDD) is a buzzword in business and human rights (BHR) activities. However, multinational corporations (MNCs) often conduct it as a tick-box exercise without transparency. Using a relational contract theory, this article argues that when MNCs contract with local communities through community development agreements (CDAs) to perform HRDD, such contracts are internationalized relational contracts that attract a level of good faith. An established principle in international economic law, good faith serves as a standard for assessing conduct designed to discharge obligations in international contracts between states and MNCs (investor-state contracts). Similar to how investor-state arbitration tribunals use good faith jurisprudence in regulating the relationship between states and MNCs, this article proposes a BHR good faith jurisprudence to prescribe how HRDD obligations should be discharged. The article concludes that a good faith interpretational exercise in BHR would (1) reduce MNCs’ cosmetic compliance with HRDD principles; (2) increase transparency in the HRDD exercise; and (3) become a source of rights for local communities to enforce corporate accountability.

Ben & Jerry's – the famous ice cream brand known for its quirky flavours and social justice ethos – announced in 2021 that it would withdraw its products from Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). This announcement sparked controversy, with an impact on the company and its parent, Unilever. While the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) (UNGP) have established themselves as the leading international governance framework for the social responsibilities of businesses, their application to conflict-affected areas lacks clarity. Questions remain, including when is a company legally complicit in violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), and when is a corporate exit from an area under military occupation the appropriate and responsible thing to do. This article uses Ben & Jerry's withdrawal from the OPT as the basis for investigating these questions. It finds that while it is unlikely that Ben & Jerry's would be exposed to any legal liability for violating IHL through its product sales in Israeli settlements in the OPT, its withdrawal aligns with its responsibilities under the UNGP as a reasonable and prudent corporate action in response to its activities being linked to enduring and severe IHL violations.

Multiple independent studies have highlighted the remarkable process of multistakeholder dialogue in the development of Peru’s first National Action Plan (NAP) on business and human rights. While facing several challenges, not least a global pandemic, the process was indeed a success in so far as it opened up a new path for policy making in Peru: that of multistakeholder dialogue including actors who traditionally deeply mistrust each other. This piece describes the key enabling conditions and operational strengths that allowed for such a highly participatory process and, ultimately, resulted in some strong commitments on business and human rights.

This article uses Statoil (Equinor since 2018) as a prism to explore some key features and concerns of Western oil companies’ evolving human rights awareness from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. This period saw the first human rights lawsuits brought against oil companies and a gradual change in their human rights awareness. The article uses insights from the business history literature and new archival material from the oil industry to explain why business ethicists and legal scholars are wrong to argue that the relationship between business and social responsibility, on the one hand, and business and human rights, on the other, are inherently problematic and profoundly disparate due to their divergent historical origins. In so doing, the article offers a historical take on the so-called debate between business human rights (BHR) and corporate social responsibility (CSR), and it repudiates the argument that a so-called minimal understanding of human rights has hindered business from undertaking proactive human rights initiatives. Mapping onto both the business history literature and the BHR–CSR debate, the article aims for a richer understanding of the experiences and ideas that incentivized oil companies to “get serious” about human rights.

This paper analyses five constitutional developments in Central and Eastern Europe that can impact the domestic implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Using Czechia, Poland and Slovenia as examples, the paper highlights four potential drivers, namely: (1) the process of constitutionalizing human rights; (2) the proliferation of the doctrine of horizontal effect of constitutional rights; (3) the constitutional legitimacy of state intervention in the free market economy; and (4) the mechanism of judicial review. Furthermore, the author underlines the most significant challenge, which is increasing resistance to international norms in some countries, e.g., Poland. The paper concludes that the jurisprudence of the constitutional courts can facilitate the domestic implementation of the UNGPs, particularly Pillars I (State duty to protect human rights) and III (access to remedy).

This article explores the extent to which key normative and institutional responses to the challenges raised by the digital age are compatible with, or interact with, changes in key features of the existing international human rights law (IHRL) framework. Furthermore, the article claims that the IHRL framework is already changing, partly due to its interaction with digital human rights. This moving normative landscape creates new opportunities for promoting human rights in the digital age, but might also raise new concerns about the political acceptability of IHRL. Following an introduction, Section B of the article will describe the development of digital human rights, using a “three generations” typology. Section C will explain how new developments in the field of digital human rights coincide with broader developments in IHRL, including: the extra-territorial application of human rights, obligations on governments to actively regulate private businesses and the erosion of normative boundaries separating specific human rights treaties from other parts of IHRL and international law. These two segments are followed by concluding remarks.

Meta, formerly the Facebook Company, faces immense pressure from users, governments, and civil society to act transparently and with accountability. Responding to such calls, in 2018, it announced plans to create an independent oversight body to review content decisions. Such a forum is now in place in the form of the Oversight Board. To Meta’s credit, the speed at which the Oversight Board has been established is remarkable. Within two years, a global consultation process was completed with input obtained from users as well as experts, the regulatory infrastructure for the Oversight Board built, its members selected, and the first decisions of the Board already rendered in January 2021. With its institutional structure in place, and plenty of resources to tap into, the Oversight Board could have a real effect on how some transnational disputes are resolved. Thus, the Oversight Board may very well be setting the direction for how tech companies in particular, and multinational corporations in general, go about providing grievance mechanisms to individuals who their actions adversely affect. Through a study of the Oversight Board, this article considers whether we are witnessing the birth of a special type of “transnational hybrid adjudication” that could have a systemic impact on international law, or an experiment with limited relevance.

The UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) and their concept of human rights due diligence (HRDD) cannot succeed in their current form, because they reify neoliberalism’s public/private divide. This article establishes this argument across historical, theoretical, and normative dimensions, and charts a new way forward. The UNGPs’ separation of the ‘state duty to protect’ from the ‘corporate responsibility to respect’ reflects a contestable conception of companies as private actors: free to act/transact in any way that is not harmful. This is a problem because harm is often invisible, even when taking an active due-diligence approach. To resolve this, HRDD practices must also be based on the positive value of equality. However, businesses are more than mere agents; they also coordinate production and enable social connections. These structural features reveal a ‘missing fourth pillar’ of the UNGPs: a collective political responsibility to challenge and change our current world order.

We introduce this symposium of articles by explaining the notions of hard and soft law, and reviewing UN developments on business and human rights in this light. We move to a more detailed discussion of existing hard law, particularly the state duty to protect, before examining examples of fulfilment of that duty via the domestication (especially the judicialization) of human rights norms for business. We also note the many pitfalls in contemporary approaches, before examining how the proposed legally binding instrument might address those pitfalls. We conclude with commentary on how soft and hard norms to date have failed to grapple with corporate power, the issue which animates the need for a business human rights debate in the first place, before introducing the articles to follow.

Seasonal migrants’ exploitation in Europe, especially in agriculture, is often seen as having its origins in failure of migration or labour policies. Indeed, the virtual impossibility to enter a country as a regular non-European Union (EU) worker coupled with the needs of agricultural work, requiring low-skilled workforce and short time notice for recruitment, generates a perfect environment for exploitation and the related phenomenon of gangmastering. However, work exploitation in agriculture is nowadays a structural problem, requiring structural changes in the way food is produced and intended by the agri-food supply chain as a whole. Indeed, a truly preventative approach needs not only to protect seasonal migrants from human rights violations, but also to involve agribusiness in tackling the root causes of migrants’ exploitation. Building on international standards on business and human rights, the aim of this contribution is to propose a more holistic view of the phenomenon workers exploitation in agriculture. Recent European policies seem to have understood this need, calling enterprises and farmers to bear their responsibility by introducing an accountability discourse for the agribusiness and the food supply chain, either indirectly or directly. The new social conditionality clause in the Common Agricultural Policy, the Directive on Unfair Practices in Agriculture and the recent Commission proposal for a Directive on mandatory human rights due diligence should therefore be read in conjunction with major developments in international law that call for the responsibility of powerful private actors operating in agri-food sector.

Taking a law-and-governance approach, this article addresses legal certainty in international human rights law as it applies to artificial intelligence (AI). After introducing key issues concerning legal certainty, a comparative analysis of AI law-and-governance initiatives at the international, regional and national levels is undertaken. The article argues that many initiatives contribute to increased legal certainty and can partially compensate for some of the shortcomings of the international human rights law framework, but that further clarification is badly needed. This is especially true for the responsibilities of private businesses which are developing AI and the corpus of human rights beyond privacy and data protection.

This article proposes to see the history of the international law on foreign investment as about the promotion of investor rights as much as the resistance to investor obligations. The argument is that the divide between investment protection and the responsibility of foreign investors is one of the most significant features of international investment law. The article shows that the different treatment of rights and obligations is grounded in the same business project and legal imagination. Maintaining this divide has never been easy, as this model faced resistance, particularly from Latin America, trade unions and human rights activists. The analysis concludes by noting that academics can contribute to reimagining the international law on foreign investment by bringing investment treaty law and business and human rights closer. This shift is already happening.

This invited response commentary engages with Benoit Mayer's case comment, published in this issue of Transnational Environmental Law, on the recent landmark decision by the District Court of The Hague (The Netherlands) of May 2021 in Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell. The Court ordered the oil giant Royal Dutch Shell to reduce at least 45% of its greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared with 2019 levels. In this response commentary I build on and contrast Mayer's examination of how the Court arrived at this target. In doing so, I discuss the normativity of tort law compared with international law against the background of the ideas of Martti Koskenniemi. I conclude that the District Court legitimately qualified Shell's business plans as tortious. The specific reduction target is the result of civil procedural rules on evidence and the debate between the parties. In the light of this analysis, I respectfully reject Benoit Mayer's suggestion that sectoral practices should play a more significant role in determining corporate climate mitigation obligations. In my view, such an approach would be dangerously apologetic and lead to dystopian outcomes.