By November 1940, les forces françaises libres had swelled to 19,679 soldiers. Arguably the setback at Dakar became a benefit, because it hardened and focused the French exile movement, forced it to adjust to a long-war strategy, and obliged de Gaulle to initiate the transition from a military organization with a political agenda into a political movement with an, albeit constricted, armed wing. With the creation on 27 October 1940 of a Conseil de la défense de l’Empire, the external resistance was now a legitimate territorial power. In the BCRA, la France libre had an organization with the potential to structure and operationalize an as yet diminutive but inevitable internal resistance. On the debit side, la France libre remained an insecure movement with a narrow and underdeveloped African base, factionalized between soldiers and civilians, between the various branches of the movement, torn between its civil war with Vichy and the compulsion to fight the Germans. The BCRA was inexperienced in clandestine mobilization, without a strategy, and dependent on the British for resources. While de Gaulle exhibited many noble qualities, even elements of true greatness, and had stamped his personality on his organization, his attributes were offset by an autocratic temperament and imperious behavior that exasperated allies and alienated potential supporters. Furthermore, Vichy still commanded its High Seas Fleet and controlled the strategically important Levant, Dakar, and AFN. Pétain also enjoyed patriotic prestige and credibility with a French population disoriented by defeat, eager to secure the release of French POWs, and convinced that he was plotting “la revanche” against Germany. British policy continued to recognize Vichy while supporting de Gaulle. With the United States poised to enter the conflict, relations among the three allies would grow more complex.

By 1942, the Soviet Union and the United States had joined the conflict, further isolating Vichy. Resistance in France was growing, acknowledged by a change of name from la France libre to la France combattante to acknowledge a growing resistance movement inside France. Jean Moulin had been dispatched to organize and harness it to la France combattante’s political agenda, and to define its missions. While de Gaulle’s movement remained small, the FFL had demonstrated fighting resolve at Bir Hakeim, a small but symbolic step toward wiping away the stain of 1940. Vichy’s deepening collaboration with Hitler helped to put la France combattante on firmer political footing, and strengthened de Gaulle’s political standing. Nevertheless, as de Gaulle realized, the Americans in particular posed a more immediate threat to the achievement of his goal of reasserting French grandeur and global influence than did either the Germans or Vichy. It would require all of de Gaulle’s determination and political savvy to keep la France combattante from being relegated to one of the Second World War’s obscure footnotes in the wake of Operation Torch – the November 1942 Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa.