Understanding Stalin's foreign policy requires examining his shifting approach to the unfolding Cold War. Up until 1945, he sought great power cooperation in Europe, but later rejected compromise with the United States for fear of exposing Soviet weakness. Stalin’s failed gambit for influence in Iran and Turkey showed the limitations of heavy-handed bullying of neighboring countries: in both cases, he had to retreat and retrench. Meanwhile, in Greece, Stalin shifted opportunistically from a cautious noninvolvement to increasing support for the Communist insurgency. But his Balkan strategy was complicated by an unexpected quarrel with Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito, fueled by Stalin’s jealousy and mistrust. Stalin’s realization in 1947 that left-leaning coalitions that he sponsored across Eastern Europe were not electable marked a turning point towards confrontation with the West. Stalin began to prioritize security over legitimacy. This logic led him towards an attempt to dislodge the Allies from divided Berlin, resulting, by 1949, in a complete division of Europe.

When Soviet forces blockaded West Berlin in 1948, many Germans still considered Americans as enemies. They viewed the occupying troops with suspicion, even hostility. But Stalin’s ill-considered gambit of cutting off food, medicine, and coal cast the Soviets in a much harsher light. It enabled America to assume the role of savior. This chapter considers how America transformed its image in the eyes of average Germans as well as those around the world, thanks to its heroism during the Berlin Airlift.