The negative effect doctrine discussed in this chapter deals with when, if ever, a state court will stay proceedings before it and refer disputants to the arbitrators for them to decide, in the first instance, whether an arbitration agreement between the parties (i) exists, (ii) is valid, and (iii) has a scope that covers the dispute in question. An affirmative answer on each of these points would mean that the dispute’s merits must be decided in arbitration. Thus, the negative effect issue concerns whether a decision on these three jurisdiction sub-issues should be decided with finality by the court itself at the outset, or, in the first instance, by the arbitrators themselves, with possible court review on jurisdiction delayed until later.The chapter discusses the dramatically different approaches to the negative effect issue followed in several leading arbitral jurisdictions: France, Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, the U.K., and Canada (Quebec).It also discusses the underlying policy issues at stake in the different national approaches to the doctrine.In conclusion the chapter offer’s the author’s view of a preferred approach to the negative effect issue.

For present purposes, I take “America’s Unwritten Constitution” to refer (at least in some measure) to the norms, conventions, and practices that have developed in America to give meaning to, and fill in the gaps of, the constitutional text that was penned in 1787, ratified by a requisite number of states shortly thereafter, and formally amended by the Bill of Rights in 1791 and seventeen times during the two-and-a-quarter centuries since. One important constraint on the nation’s Unwritten Constitution is that is must, at some acceptable level, accommodate itself to the written document. A related feature of the Unwritten Constitution is that, as with the formal text, abiding aspects of the unwritten version need to be anchored in some kind of political foundation. These two features of the Unwritten Constitution – a fidelity to the document itself and a grounding in democratic processes – can be helpfully appreciated by examining another crucial component of today’s Unwritten Constitution, and one as to which federal courts have generally been much less central in determining the meaning and operation of the written Constitution’s provisions: the way we select Presidents in America.