In the early 1980s, Soviet–US relations, which had deteriorated since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, reached a new low under President Ronald Reagan, who imposed sanctions on the USSR and escalated nuclear build-up. This chapter investigates Moscow's growing challenges: a quagmire in Afghanistan, and a crisis in Poland in 1980–81, which very nearly resulted in a Soviet military intervention. The chapter documents internal Soviet debate on the pros and cons of invading Poland to quash the anti-Communist protests. It then recounts the Kremlin's response to Reagan's militant rhetoric: increasing paranoia, fears of a pre-emptive strike, and a renewed interest in better relations with China.

Chapter 7 covers the remainder of 1983, widely regarded as the most dangerous year of the second half of the Cold War. A series of events raised US–Soviet tensions and public fears of nuclear war: Reagan’s SDI announcement; the Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner, which cost the lives of 62 Americans; the US invasion of Grenada; antinuclear protests across Western Europe and America; the US deployment of INF missiles in Europe; and the Able Archer “war scare.” But these events obscure a development quite as significant: Reagan’s growing awareness of the political context (at home and abroad), and signs of a readiness to depart from the hard-liners’ position. With Shultz’s prompting, the president sought to initiate a dialogue with Moscow and became receptive to the idea of modifying the US approach to arms control. He reacted with restraint to the KAL disaster, and toned down the anti-Soviet rhetoric. Even before the Able Archer crisis there had been a change in Reagan’s attitude. It reflected his own moderate views, a desire to improve relations, and an increased sense of his domestic imperatives. As his election campaign began, Reagan was pragmatist was emerging.