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1 results

  • 15 - “Habit Is Thus the Enormous Flywheel of Society”

  • from Part III - Socially Embeddded and Culturally Extended Habits
  • Edited by Fausto Caruana, Italo Testa, Università degli Studi, Parma
  • Book:
    Habits
    Published online:
    24 November 2020
    Print publication:
    03 December 2020, pp 320-336

  • Summary

    Pragmatism arose in response to the dominant philosophical ideas of the time, one of which was neo-Kantianism. Present approaches in cognitive science often derive from basic neo-Kantian ideas, notably the notion that social life and language depend on shared “frames.” Pragmatism rejected these neo-Kantian ideas, and instead relied on an extended notion of habit. But the extension required a response to some core neo-Kantian concerns. Pragmatism provided some psychological thinking, especially in William James, and in the critique of the reflex arc concept. This was paralleled and extended by Russian psychologists. They developed a research program which supported alternative accounts of the key problematics of neo-Kantianism, such as the nature of categories and of abstraction. This bears directly on social theory, which uncritically adopted ideas of shared frameworks as an explanatory shortcut, without providing a psychological or cognitive account of how this kind of sharing was possible.