In contrast to Western platforms, which are dominated by crowdsourced labour, China's food-delivery platforms rely heavily on outsourced couriers to provide high-quality services. The conflicts emerging from outsourced labour relations have been inadequately examined. Based on extensive fieldwork in south China, this study reveals an intriguing fact: the outsourcing model frequently triggers yet largely conceals couriers’ strikes. This study uses the work regime approach and labour bargaining power theory to analyse the complex dynamics created by the platforms. By scrutinizing state institutions, relationships among various organizations and workplace interactions, this study finds that the platform firms have dominant power but that inherent tensions exist between outsourcing platform firms, outsourced agencies, human supervisors and workers, forming a regime that this study calls “contentious despotism.” Importantly, labour conflict is alive and potentially enduring in China's gigantic platform economy.

The governance of China under Xi Jinping functions mainly through leading groups. Using the case of water governance, this article examines the interaction between these groups at three levels: the top-level design group, the riverine macroregion groups and the implementation groups. This governance model is designed to avoid nomenklatura failure, restrict fiscal federalism and reduce the agency problem between the centre and local leaders. For the purpose of water governance, China has been divided into five blocs based on river basins, which we call riverine macroregions. Using this approach, the Chinese Communist Party is combining water governance with regional development and enhancing local governments’ collective implementation of central policy.

Why do some Chinese cities take part in waves of nationalist protest but not others? Nationalist protest remains an important but understudied topic within the study of contentious politics in China, particularly at the subnational level. Relative to other protests, nationalist mobilization is more clustered in time and geographically widespread, uniting citizens in different cities against a common target. Although the literature has debated the degree of state-led and grassroots influence on Chinese nationalism, we argue that it is important to consider both the propensity of citizens to mobilize and local government fears of instability. Analysing an original dataset of 377 anti-Japanese protests across 208 of 287 Chinese prefectural cities, we find that both state-led patriotism and the availability of collective action resources were positively associated with nationalist protest, particularly “biographically available” populations of students and migrants. In addition, the government's role was not monolithically facilitative. Fears of social unrest shaped the local political opportunity structure, with anti-Japanese protests less likely in cities with larger populations of unemployed college graduates and ethnic minorities and more likely in cities with established leaders.