This chapter challenges the commonly held assumption that the ‘ulama have been displaced by their Islamic nation-states. I demonstrate the clerics’ contemporary relevance by interrogating conjunctures of dispute and rivalry between Pakistani Sunni ‘ulama and their state’s religious arms, particularly the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII). The CII is a constitutional body charged with advising the president, Parliament and Provincial Assemblies on how to Islamize the legislation and the country more broadly. At the chapter’s heart lie recent debates between the CII and the ‘ulama over women’s rights. Through exploring these contestations, I assert that despite challenges from the state’s religious institutions, the ‘ulama retain their religious authority and prestige. I highlight how Pakistani ‘ulama – some with and some without affiliations with the state apparatus – partake in constituting and cultivating the state by pressuring political functionaries to acquiesce to their demands. In concluding, I use the ‘ulama’s discourses and demands to comment on the nature of the Pakistani public sphere and how religious authority operates in that sphere. Finally, by drawing on ‘ulama–state debates on the rights of women, I propose a novel manner of appraising the function of the Council of Islamic Ideology, particularly during 2006–2008.

Pakistani Shi‘as have often been painted as blind followers of the Iranian state’s political project. This fifth and final chapter challenges this dominant narrative. The author draws on her fieldwork among Shi‘a ‘ulama, showcasing the diversity and vibrancy of Shi‘a theo-political thought. Her ethnography highlights that three distinct theo-political projects characterize her interlocutors’ discourses. These are: (1) a secular state, (2) a sectarianly unaligned Islamic state, and (3) a state in which the governance of the jurist (wilayat-i faqih) – the political model of the current Iranian state – is implemented. Despite their differences, I contend that all these theo-political projects are propelled by the same force – the specter of violence. I assert that while the threat of violence drives these distinct political theologies, narrative historiography serves as an indispensable legitimizer. The ‘ulama articulate Pakistani history in a manner that justifies their specific theo-political projects. Significantly, Shi‘a ‘ulama’s political projects are often formulated and articulated in private realms for fear of state reprisal. Consequently, the ethnographic focus of this chapter is vital in highlighting the range of Shi‘a thought.

This chapter offers a theoretical analysis of Shi‘a ‘ulama’s conceptions of and engagements with their state in the midst of sectarian violence. My close study of Shi‘a religious journals and fieldwork among the ‘ulama highlights that many clerics view the state as culpable for Shi‘a deaths, not simply despite the state’s claim to an Islamic identity, but in some instances, because of Pakistan’s Sunni Islamic leanings. The chapter then interrogates why the very ‘ulama who critique the state for its complicity in Shi‘a deaths also appeal to the state for protection. By way of answer, I argue that when viewing the state as a configuration of institutions whose negative effects they experience, the ‘ulama rebuke the state for its complicity in anti-Shi‘a violence. However, when viewing the state as an idea, fantasy or image, the ‘ulama understand it as a legitimate authoritative body transcending society and providing security. Drawing on philosophical and anthropological works on the state, I explain that the ‘ulama’s appeals for protection help constitute the state by reproducing the effect of the state idea or fantasy through discourses and bodily practices. I argue that the approach to the state adopted by this chapter can be fruitfully applied to study state–‘ulama relations across the Muslim world.

This chapter studies debates over sovereignty between the ‘ulama and the state. It does so by examining the killing of the Pakistani governor Salman Taseer and his alleged act of insulting Muhammad. The author asserts that in the case of Taseer’s killing, and in blasphemy cases more broadly, the issue of sovereignty boils down to the question of who can deem the insulter worthy of death and execute this punishment. The state, considering itself sovereign, reserves this right for itself. Consequently, it deemed Taseer’s extrajudicial killing a murder and awarded the death penalty to his assassin. The ‘ulama regard God as the ultimate sovereign. They assert that His sovereignty is vested in His law, the shari‘a, which they interpret and articulate. Many ‘ulama maintain that according to the shari‘a, insulting Muhammad is such a grievous crime that anyone can legitimately commit sovereign violence against a Prophet-insulter. Importantly, a minority among the ‘ulama support the state’s monopoly over legitimate violence. These ‘ulama also claim to formulate their arguments from within the shari‘a. In a broader sense, this chapter’s exploration of blasphemy intervenes in the debate of whether an Islamic state – i.e. a polity that demands its own sovereignty, but also emphasizes its reverence for God’s sovereignty – is possible.

This chapter studies debates over sovereignty between the ‘ulama and the state. It does so by examining the killing of the Pakistani governor Salman Taseer and his alleged act of insulting Muhammad. I assert that in the case of Taseer’s killing, and in blasphemy cases more broadly, the issue of sovereignty boils down to the question of who can deem the insulter worthy of death and execute this punishment. The state, considering itself sovereign, reserves this right for itself. Consequently, it deemed Taseer’s extrajudicial killing a murder and awarded the death penalty to his assassin. The ‘ulama regard God as the ultimate sovereign. They assert that His sovereignty is vested in His law, the shari‘a, which they interpret and articulate. Many ‘ulama maintain that according to the shari‘a, insulting Muhammad is such a grievous crime that anyone can legitimately commit sovereign violence against a Prophet-insulter. Importantly, a minority among the ‘ulama support the state’s monopoly over legitimate violence. These ‘ulama also claim to formulate their arguments from within the shari‘a. In a broader sense, this chapter’s exploration of blasphemy intervenes in the debate of whether an Islamic state – i.e. a polity that demands its own sovereignty, but also emphasizes its reverence for God’s sovereignty – is possible.