Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Political and Economic Change since 1952
- 3 Elections and Elite Management
- 4 The Politics of Infrastructure Provision
- 5 Electoral Budget Cycles and Economic Opportunism
- 6 Vote Buying, Turnout, and Spoiled Ballots
- 7 Elections and Elite Corruption
- 8 Elections and the Muslim Brotherhood
- 9 Liberal Intellectuals and the Demand for Democratic Change
- 10 Foreign Pressure and Institutional Change
- 11 Egypt in Comparative Perspective
- 12 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 February 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Political and Economic Change since 1952
- 3 Elections and Elite Management
- 4 The Politics of Infrastructure Provision
- 5 Electoral Budget Cycles and Economic Opportunism
- 6 Vote Buying, Turnout, and Spoiled Ballots
- 7 Elections and Elite Corruption
- 8 Elections and the Muslim Brotherhood
- 9 Liberal Intellectuals and the Demand for Democratic Change
- 10 Foreign Pressure and Institutional Change
- 11 Egypt in Comparative Perspective
- 12 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The existence of electoral competition, at times fierce and expensive, seems paradoxical in an authoritarian context, where the selection of regime leadership has already been made. Yet nearly all autocrats hold some form of elections, and hegemonic party regimes – such as the one in Egypt – represent one of the most common forms of dictatorship in the world (Magaloni 2006). This book seeks to unravel a series of interrelated puzzles about elections in Egypt: In what ways does the authoritarian regime benefit from holding elections? Why do candidates spend scarce resources to run for a seat in a parliament that does not make policy? Why do citizens engage in the costly act of voting in such a context? And do we observe patterns of economic change surrounding autocratic elections that resemble the trends observed in democracies? The answers to these questions are critical to understanding the mechanics of authoritarian survival, both in Egypt and elsewhere. I argue that the authoritarian regime in Egypt has endured not despite competitive elections, but, to some degree, because of these elections.
A number of themes run throughout this project. The first is that the authoritarian regime in Egypt has made increasing use of competitive, market-style mechanisms to mediate political relationships over time. Second, economic change and a generalized withdrawal of the Egyptian state from its hegemonic economic role in society have both had an impact on the nature of relations among the regime, elite, and citizenry.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010
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