In the previous chapter, a very brief developmental history was provided concerning solitary confinement, which was followed by a brief discussion of the emergence of supermax penitentiaries beginning with the opening of Alcatraz in 1933. In this chapter a more philosophically situated discussion will be offered concerning the ethical implications concerning the structural realities imposed on those individuals placed in such a restrictive correctional setting. Central to this discussion will be an exploration of the shifting intentionally, which was often used to justify the phenomenology of this type of correctional intervention. It will be further argued that the apparatus of solitary confinement is the process by which this state exception reveals itself as a zone of indifference, ultimately resulting in the continued use of this extreme example of correctional practice. To better conceptualize this perspective, I would like to begin with an observation provided by Alasdair MacIntyre (1988) in his text, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?

In his attempt to rehabilitate Aristotle and Virtue Ethics for the contemporary reader, MacIntyre (1988) states “Aristotle's mistake, and the mistake of others who have reasoned similarly, was not to understand how domination of a certain kind is in fact the cause of those characteristics of the dominated which are then invoked to justify unjustified domination” (p. 105). Though it is important to add that MacIntyre's observation was specifically intended to address Aristotle's view of women and his position concerning slavery, it is equally true that this observation has very important implications for the current discussion. The relationship between dominator and the dominated can be easily recognized within the context of the practice of solitary confinement and the expanding use of isolated incarceration strategies currently employed by supermax penitentiaries.

As MacIntyre observes, unjustified domination normally occurs when a specific group is designated as being in some way ontologically inferior, which in turn is employed to rationalize what follows. Once in place, the structural realities of this form of domination are ignored relative to the injurious effects it imposes on those so dominated. Any attempt by the dominated individual or group to challenge the meaning or structure of these conditions is then used as the evidentiary basis by on which more stringent strategies of domination may be employed.