Though the eighteenth year of the Permanent Court of International Justice has been the most critical year in its history, the Court has carried on its work in a regular way and some notable additions to its jurisprudence have been made during the year.

In the early months of the year, the Court held two series of meetings, from January 19 to April 4, and from May 15 to June 15; later in the year a series of meetings was held from November 28 to December 5. The Court was in actual session during the year for a total of 116 days; this was considerably less than the average of 144 days for each of the previous seventeen years, though it exceeded the number of 69 days of actual session during the year 1938.

On October 30, 1939, a series of 153 awards in the so-called Sabotage Claims against Germany was handed down by the Mixed Claims Commission under the Agreement of August 10, 1922, between the United States and Germany. These awards were made pursuant to the decision of the Commission rendered on June 15, 1939, and the order entered the same day, which held that German sabotage agents in this country were responsible for the destruction of the Black Tom Terminal on the night of July 29,1916, and the Kingsland Plant on January 11, 1917, and that Germany was liable for the damages resulting from these destructions. After the pleadings had been filed in 1927-1928, together with considerable evidence, and after the argument in Washington in April, 1929, and the reargument at The Hague in September, 1930, the Commission withdrew to Hamburg and rendered a decision dated October 16, 1930, dismissing all of the claims as not involving German responsibility. The Commission, however, found that the German Government had authorized a general campaign of sabotage in the United States during the period of neutrality and had sent men to this country for that purpose. The efforts of the American Agent in opposition to the German Agent to obtain a reconsideration of this decision resulted in several decisions of interest to the science of international law. The limited space permits only a summary discussion of the main questions.

It is to be hoped that one of the first measures to which Congress will give its attention during the next session will be the bill (H. R. 6127) “To revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code.” This bill was introduced by the Honorable Samuel Dickstein, Chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of Representatives, May 3,1939. It embodies a draft nationality code, which was prepared under the direction of a committee composed of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Labor, in pursuance of an Executive Order of April 25, 1933. The cabinet committee submitted its report June 1, 1938, upon the basis of extensive studies and conferences by officials of the three Departments, and the report was submitted to Congress with a message of the President dated June 13, 1938.

The decisions of the British courts in The Arantzazu Mendi and Banco de Bilbao v. Sancha and Rey that the British Government had accorded de facto recognition to the Franco insurgents become all the more curious in the light of unequivocal denials by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons that such recognition had been accorded prior to the dates of these decisions. An examination of these statements in the House of Commons raises an interesting question: What constitutes de facto recognition? More particularly, do (1) the conclusion of an agreement of a “provisional” nature with an unrecognized régime, or (2) the institution of “unofficial” relations (relations officieuses) therewith, or (3) the granting of immunities to executive agents, constitute de facto recognition of the régime so treated?

The tendency in recent world history toward the establishment of political parties based on class or racial ideologies in which no place of respect is given to established territorial boundaries has greatly intensified the problem of the responsibility of states in connection with international propaganda. Two main questions arise: (1) Are states themselves obliged under international law to refrain from spreading propaganda in a foreign country hostile to its government? and (2) Are they obliged to use due diligence to prevent private individuals and organizations from engaging in such activity? The purpose of this study is to seek the answer to these questions through an analysis of the sources of international law referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice: (a) international conventions, (b) diplomatic exchanges, giving evidence of international custom, (c) general principles embodied in municipal laws and judicial decisions, and (d) the attitude of writers on international law. Treatment of the subject will begin here with the period of the French Revolution and will be limited to peace-time political propaganda. The problem is, of course, much older and broader than these limits suggest, but it is believed that their extension would not contribute materially to the purpose at hand.

Trading in grains was light, price fluctuations small, on the St. Louis Merchants Exchange during the Saturday session, January 23, 1915. The brokers, as they stood in small groups around the sample bins and the quotation boards, had opportunity to discuss the sensational venture on which one of their Exchange members had embarked. The newspapers that morning carried the story that the W. L. Green Commission Company, one of the oldest and most respected firms on the Exchange, had the day before shipped a cargo of foodstuffs on board the steamship Wilhelmina from New York, bound for Hamburg. This was reported to be the first food shipment from America to Germany since the war began, and would furnish a test case involving the British “blockade”.